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I EXPERT SYSTEMS AND PSYCHIATRY
1 INTRODUCTION
Neuropsychiatry is a multidisciplinary specialism with its origin in psychiatry and
covering the grey areas between neurology, psychiatry and psychology. As with other
multidisciplinary specialisms (for example, Artificial Intelligence. See paragraph 2.) it
is difficult to formulate a precise definition of neuropsychiatry, and it is probably best
described by what the focus of attention is. In an editorial Yudofski and Hales (1989)
state that "A prominent focus of neuropsychiatry is the assessment and treatment of
patients with psychiatric illnesses or symptoms associated with brain lesions or
dysfunction".'
Although the multidisciplinary approach of neuropsychiatry is an advantage in
studying mental disorders, for example dementia, it also poses the problem of
diversity. Each discipline brings its own manner of examination, terminology and
criteria into neuropsychiatry, which task it is to compare, combine and integrate these
findings into diagnoses that offer clinicians a basis for treatment.
One obvious solution to this problem is to give specialists training in all these
related disciplines. However, there is also an obvious -though difficult to measure-
limit as to how much knowledge from several specialisms can be crammed into one
person. Furthermore, the amount of specialists that can be expected to be trained will
be limited, which in turn will limit other clinicians to request aid or to refer their
patients.
Another solution to this problem is to combine specialized knowledge from two or
more disciplines into a medium that can aid clinicians in using knowledge that is not
part of their specialism. Since late 1960, such a potential medium is offered by
Artificial Intelligence (Al) in the form of Expert Systems (ES). As already many ESs
have been developed for medicine, we wil limit the scope of the discussion by
focussing on the ESs that were developed for psychiatry.
The first part of this chapter will be devoted to a brief discussion on the origin of Al
and how this led to ES research. The second part elaborates on what ESs are and how
they generally work. Also, four types of knowledge representation used in ESs will be
discussed. The remainder of this text will review the results of the psychiatric ESs that
were developed during the last 15 years. In the final part we will try to enumerate the
problems that were encountered by their developers and try to formulate some criteria
and goals for the development of a psychiatric ES on the domain of dementia
diagnostics.
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2 THE ORIGIN OF EXPERT SYSTEMS
In the 1950's a new field of research called Artificial Intelligence (Al) emerged as an
interdisciplinary science of cognitive psychology and computer science. * The
definition of Al has been a topic of debate ever since J. McCarthy and M. Minsky used
the name for their project at MIT in 1959. This was mainly due to the lack of a good
definition for'intelligence' and to the pretentious tone of the name. This lack of
definition made it also difficult for Al research to claim credits for new techniques,
ideas and applications, as evidenced by the so called Lighthill Report 2 in 1973, which
stated that much of the results at that time should be attributed to sciences in the cate-
gory "Advanced Automation" and "Computer-Based Studies of the Central Nervous
System". This report hampered British Al research for almost a decade, until the Alvey
Report', which also introduced the name Intelligent Knowledge-Based Systems
(IKBS) in 1982. However, the name IKBS was never accepted to the same extent as Al,
and did not terminate the definition debate (For example, see the discussion in The
Knowledge Engineering Review, started by M. Lam)',' ,b,7,a,9,10 Therefore, we will
continue using the name Al in this paper, together with D. Waterman's definition
which states that the goal of Al is "...to develop computer programs that (...) solve
problems in a way that would be considered intelligent if done by a human. "11
During the first decade of Al, this goal was pursued by scientists trying to develop
general problem solvers (GPS). Although this effort failed, it did bring about one
major finding: problem-solving is more a matter of knowledge than of inference
techniques. Al researchers had severely underestimated the amount of (common)
knowledge humans have and use for even the simplest problem to be solved. It was
also clear that the software and hardware at that time were inadequate to solve this
problem. This situation has not changed much since then. The solution to this problem
was to drastically reduce the scope of problem solvers, and to develop special-purpose
problem solvers with very limited but highly specialized knowledge, i.e. Expert
Systems (ES).
3 WHAT ARE EXPERT SYSTEMS?
Just like Al research has its debate about intelligence, ES research has its share of
debate about defining what an Expert System actually is. One definition sais that an
ES is "a computer system that achieves high levels of performance in task areas that,
for human beings, require years of special education and training." ' Z Although this
definition applies equally well for any knowledgebase program or system, most other
attemps to define what an ES is also allude to the requirement of human knowledge
and skills that is represented in the ES and lead to a performance that is equivalent to
that of a human.
• The term 'Artificial Intelligence' was first suggested by John McCarthy, co-founder of the MIT
Artificial Intelligence Project in 1959.
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However, the level of performance and the task area are not the only criteria by which
to decide whether a computer program is an ES. Several other features are commonly
considered essential: the ability to explain how a solution was reached, an intelligent
search capability (or at least no blind search). reasoning with different levels of
certainty (as opposed to a binary'yes' or 'no'), a separation between inference
mechanism and knowledge, and -last but not least- symbolic reasoning. The origin of
the discussion about these criteria can be traced back to the dispute about the
definition of Al. In a reply to Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland's
article 13, Searle suggested a separation of Al in a'hard' and a'weak' approach14
The'hard' Al was thought to develop programs that model human behavior as exactly
as possible, while the 'weak' Al was believed to be interested only in developing
programs capable of simulating human performance, i.e., produce a performance
equal or better than humans, irrespective of the means used. Although this division
can be useful to make a distinction between, for example, systems that are designed to
provide a psychological model and systems that should provide correct answers, in
practice, the distinction between modelling and simulating is less clear than Searl
seems to suggest. This is especially true for the'weak' AI, where researchers often use
probem solving methods that are thought to resemble human problem solving, for
reasons of speed. Thus, even'weak' Al researchers use models of human problem
solving. The recent development to use Al techniques in 'conventional' programs has
blurred this distinction even further. For example, on-line spelling checkers, proof
reading programs, and installation programs that try to establish an optimal
configuration for computer memory all try to solve problems which were formerly
performed by (proficient) humans. These programs even use fallible rules-of-thumb to
solve their problems.
Thus, although it is difficult to provide unambiguous criteria to distinguish ESs
from conventional computer programs, one could say that ESs focus exclusively on
tasks (presently) performed by human experts, and that ESs are built in a such way
that a user is able to ask (check) what the program'knows', what it has done, why it
has done that, and what it is about to do.' Furthermore, ESs typically cover task
domains that are at the edge of what can be done efficiently using conventional pro-
gramming aids.
The architecture of ESs is definitively different from regular programs. Most ESs
consist of three (more or less) separate parts: 1) a knowledge base, 2) an inference
engine, and 3) a user/explanation interface. (See Figure 1)
Although large differences can exist between ESs, in general the functioning of the
inference engine and the user interface depends heavily on the organization and
representation of the knowledge used. Based on ideas on how humans organize their
knowledge, several representational methods have been developed. Three of the most
common used methods are: 1) rules, 2) semantic nets and 3) frames. We will briefly
discuss each one of them.
• However, sometimes ESs are developed without explanation facility to protect the implemented
knowledge. (Peter van Lith, Lithp Systems BV. Personal communication.)
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3.1 Rule Based Knowledge Representation
In rule based ESs the main part of the knowledge is represented in rules of the form 1F:
<antecedent> THEN: <consequent>. The number of antecedents and consequents may
vary, and the IF: part of a rule may combine several antecedents using booleans like
AND or OR. During a run, the inference engine will try to match the available facts
with the antecedents, and if a match is found the rule is said to 'fire', or to be
'executed'. The consequent of a rule can be a new fact that in turn can cause one or
more rules to be executed, i.e. a chain of rules is executed. (See Table 1)
Reasoning of the ES can thus be traced
backward from the last rule, up to the first
Fact: weather = heavy_clouds rule that fired. Furthermore, the explanation
mechanism can tell the user why a certain fact
Rule 1: was not asserted, by showing which
IF: weather = Bunny antecedent(s) did not match any of the facts
THEN: chance_of_rain = none known to the inference engine.
Rule 2:
The facts used by the inference engine can
IF: weather: either be derived from the systems
THEN: chance_of_ ramn = high knowledge or by asking the required informa-
tion from the user.
New fact: chance_ of
-
 ramn = high One inference method is called'forward
chaining', because the direction of inference
Rule 3: starts with a fact, for example "weather =
IF: chance_of_rain = high heavy_clouds" (See Table 1), and checks
THEN: take_a_raincoat = wise which rule's antecedent matches this fact.
When such a rule is found, then that rule's
New fact: take_a_raincoat = wise consequent is used for further matching.
Another approach is 'backward chaining',
Table 1 Rule Based Inference. where the inference engine uses the
consequent of a rule as a goal to be proven,
for example, the fact "take_a_raincoat = wise" in Table 1. It will trace the rules
backward to prove that the hypothesis "take_a_raincoat = wise" is true. Rule 3 can
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prove the hypothesis, if the antecedent "chance_of_rain = high" can be proven, which
in turn can be proven using Rule 2, if it can be established that the "weather =
heavy_clouds'.
Although this proved to be a very powerful and flexible way of processing
knowledge, with an intuitive resemblance to human problem solving, it lacked a good
organisation of the factual (or conceptual) knowledge which is treated as an
unorganized collection of data. Additionally the organization of the rules (rule base) in
a true rule based ES is also cumbersome, as all the rules are listed sequentially and
tested one after the other until one is found that can be executed. Such a system can
easily get cought in a never ending loop of asserting and retracting facts. Other
methods of knowledge representation have been developed, such as the logic based
language Prolog, or object oriented languages such as Smalltalk. However each of
these representational methods has its own advantages and drawbacks, and none of
them has a satisfactory answer to problems like the representation and use of
uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty management) and handling of conflicting evidence (i.e.
conflict resolution).
3.2 Semantic Nets
Semantic Nets offer a model for the organization of conceptual data through the use of
meaningful connections. Each connection has a direction and a label identifying the
nature of the relation. For example, the concept'car' can have an'is_a' relation to
'vehicle', i.e.,'car' is an instance of 'vehicle'. An other link from'car' is called
'has_part' and points to the concept 'engine'.
A semantic net is a useful technique when it is important that the ES is able to find
associations with its available knowledge. However, semantic nets are less useful for
the representation of rule-like knowledge as used in rule based ESs.
3.3 Frame Based Knowledge Representation
A representation method incorporating both
former methods uses frames to depict
knowledge. A frame 15 is a kind of fill-in form
with labels and slots (See Table 2). A label is a
property of a concept, while the slot contains its
present value. Sometimes special functions are
attached to these slots called 'demons'. In
Table 2 the slot 'fuel_level" contains a value, but
also has a demon attached to make sure that the
car's speed will be 0 km/h when there is no fuel,
i.e. demons can control the relation between two
or more slots. Instead of a value, a slot could also
hold a rule or function to determine its own
value. Furthermore, frames can be used to hier-
CAR Frame
speed: 45 km/h
fuel_level: 20 1
(if fuel_level = 0
then speed = 0 km/h)
gear_level: if: speed > 10
and speed <_ 50
then: gear_level = 2
if: speed > 50
and speed <_ 80
then: gear_level = 3
archically organize knowledge. For example, in
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Table 2 the CAR frame could represent knowledge about all cars, while another frame
could represent a specific car. This child frame can then inherit attributes from its
parent and have additional attributes specific only to itself.
3.4 Hybrid Systems and Expert System Shells
The above mentioned methods are only three main stream representational
techniques. Other methods exist' b, but most present day ESs are hybrid systems
combining the strengths of rules, frames and semantic nets. Furthermore, many of
today's ESs are developed using so called ES shells. An ES shell is a computer
program with the aforementioned inference engine and explanation mechanism, but
without any knowledge. However, they do incorporate a specific representational
structure for the knowledge base. Thus, an ES shell is only suitable for task domains
where the knowledge used can be mapped onto the representation technique used in
the shell.
Many ES shells, or the ideas behind them, are related to the first medical ES called
MYCIN, developed at the Stanford University". After MYCIN was developed, it was
essentially stripped of its knowledge, leaving a shell called E(ssential)MYCIN. After
EMYCIN many other shells have been developed based on the same methodology.
The increasing computational power of mini- and microcomputers has fostered this
development even further.
4 PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT SYSTEMS
Medicine was one of the first domains for which ESs were developed, and since
MYCIN many more have been developed. However, psychiatry has never been a
major topic of interest for ES developers. During the last two decades four ESs were
developed on topics within psychiatry: HEADMED 18, BLUE-BOX19, an unnamed
psychiatric version of Pathfinder20, and Methuselah21.
4.1 HEADMED
The ES HEADMED was developed with the ES shell EMYCIN and its task was to
advise clinicians about psychopharmacology, and to function as a tutorial. As Brooks
and Heiser stated in their article, one of the aims of building HEADMED was to see
whether a rule-based control structure, derived from MYCIN, could be transferred to
a new knowledge domain 22 . Although the project was abandoned before it was
completed 23, it did point out that one of the main problems for medical ESs is to
obtain large amounts of information from the user that are needed for diagnosis and
treatment recommendation.
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4.2 BLUE-BOX
BLUE-BOX was developed to advise physicians on the selection of an appropriate
treatment for patients suffering from a depression. Like HEADMED, BLUE-BOX was
implemented in EMYCIN. It used information about the patient's symptoms and
medical history to generate a treatment recommendation, i.e., the kind of drug,
dosage, administration and side effects. The aim of developing BLUE-BOX was first of
all to investigate the knowledge engineering problem. Like HEADMED, BLUE-BOX
was never submitted to validation tests.
4.3 The Psychiatric version of Pathfinder
One of the first psychiatric ESs that was submitted to a validation test was developed
by Feinberg and Lindsay using a new version of Pathfinder 24, which was originally
an ES for the interpretation of lymph node tissue examination. This Pathfinder version
was designed to distinguish endogenous and nonendogenous depression. The ES was
tested in diagnosing 51 patients. The results showed that, of the 42 patients it was able
to diagnose, 76% received a correct classification. Unfortunately the authors provided
very scanty information about the architecture, the implemented knowledge and the
source of the standard diagnoses with which the ES was compared.
4.4 Methuselah
This ES focuses on geriatric diagnoses, more specifically on dementia, primary
degenerative dementia, multiinfarct dementia and major depression. The ES gathered
its information on-line during a consultation session using seminatural language.
Methusaleh was evaluated using the medical charts of 45 geriatric patients, and by
comparing the ES's diagnoses with "independent clinical judgement" 21 . The results
showed that in 38 cases at least one of the diagnoses generated by Methuselah was in
agreement with the clinical diagnoses. However, no detailed information was
presented about those diagnoses, nor about the clinicians who functioned as a source
for independent judgments.
5 DISCUSSION
There are several lessons to be learned from the psychiatric ESs developed during the
last 2 decades.
Firstly, as Morelli et al. already stated several years ago: "the development and
utilization of expert systems in the mental health field has lagged behind their use in
other domains i25 . Unfortunately this situation has not changed since. In the same
article, Morelli et al. suggest that this slow penetration of ES in psychiatry is due to the
limitations in the nosology of mental disorders. They further note that, due to the Jack
of hard physiological criteria, psychiatry bases much of its diagnoses on behavioral
criteria which they consider far more difficult to implement in an ES than, for
example, the underlying pathogenesis. The use of such descriptive criteria was also
8 Expert Systems and Psychiatry
regarded as an obstacle by Werner2' who described psychiatry, or more specifically
geriatric psychiatry, as an ill structured task domain. However, we disagree with their
view that ESs for psychiatrie diagnostics are too difficult and that it would be more
productive to develop ESs for patient treatment and management. Once again we may
quote Morelli et al. that "important breakthroughs in this area will likely depend upon
the adoption of a more widely accepted and more detailed descriptive basis for
diagnostic decisions" 25 In other words, part of the problem lies in the standardization
and exactness of the diagnostic criteria, and not in its descriptive nature. Apart from
the fact that a good understanding of diagnostics is required to be able to formulate
appropriate treatment and management recommendations, none of the authors
discusses the possibilities ESs offer in improving diagnostic criteria and consensus.
ESs can form an important means for testing and comparing formalized diagnostic
criteria. For example, if a set of criteria is changed in favor of another one which is
supposed to make a better decision possible, they could both be tested in an ES to see
whether the result is what was expected.
Secondly, another important lesson to be learned from the aforementioned projects
is that the destiny of ESs that were mainly developed to investigate certain Al related
problems are doomed to end without the prospect of producing a field application.
After reporting the problems and solutions the developers (or their institution) loose
interest in the domain and focus on a different (Al related) problem. For an ES to
become useful, it seems that the focus of attention should be the problem domain, and
not some specific Al related problem such as a new search algorithm. Furthermore,
thorough evaluation studies are required to establish the expertise of the ES and to
show both the weak and the strong points of the system.
Thirdly, as reported by several developers, it is deemed of utmost importance to
increase the availability of ESs. First of all, this means that ESs should be available at
the clinicians desktop. In this respect it clearly does not suffice to have a terminal on a
desk connected to a minicomputer or mainframe, i.e., time-shared computers, because
such systems often show "unpredictable fluctuations of response time"Z'.
Fourthly, ESs should be built such that they offer the possibility to decrease the
amount of time needed from the clinician to enter the desired information. One
solution would be to integrate the system with a data base. However, a more obvious
improvement would be to provide the user with fill-in forms and a list of the possible
answers to select from. As with databases, these forms could be filled in by the
clinician or a trained medical assistant after the medical examination. All previously
reviewed ESs use semi natural language data input, which is very time consuming
and certainly not error proof.
Fifthly, as stated before, neuropsychiatry is a medical field which uses information
from many different disciplines, like neurology and psychology. Consequently, a
neuropsychiatrie ES should include relevant expertise from related disciplines, for
example, neurology and psychology. Of the 4 previously discussed ESs, only
Methuselah comes close to that prerequisite, even though its developer (Werner21)
places it in the domain of geriatric psychiatry. Such a discipline centered approach can
be found in most other ESs. For example, the few neurologie ESs, such as NEUREX26
on the domain of neurological localization and NEUROLOGIST-I 27 for the
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localization of lesions within the central nervous system, all operate within the
boundaries of neurology.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In order to build a neuropsychiatric ES while avoiding the problems previously
mentioned, the following aims should be pursued:
1. The ES should be built to aid clinicians in making a diagnosis in a specific field of
neuropsychiatry, and not (at least not solely) as a means to test some specific Al
related problem as a goal in itself.
2. The ES should encompass knowledge from different fields, preferably with the aid
of one expert that is proficient in the related fields. Thus it can be prevented that
conflicting expertise, for example, due to different schools of thought, will impede
the development of the ES at an early stage. A confrontation between the expertise
of the ES and other experts will be more fruitful after the ES has shown what its
implemented knowledge can accomplish.
3. Although the aim of the ES should be to reach a proficiency equal or better than the
average clinicians working in the specified field, it should not be developed with
the aim to provide an exact model of the human expert problem solving behaviour.
Any system that could presently be developed would lack many of the capabilities
of the human expert. Instead, the aim should be to extract a protocol from the
human expert that is useful for implementation and delivers the desired
performance.
4. The ES should be easily available for clinicians, preferably in the same way that
other instruments are available, i.e., as a personal tool. Thus the ES should be
developed with the aim to use it on a personal computer with a financially
attractive configuration.
5. There is no need for an ES to be able to communicate with its user through a
seminatural language interface. Such interfaces still lack the sofistication actually
needed and place unnecessary high demands on the available hardware and
software. A much simpler and effective approach would be to offer the user
standard fill-in forms with lists to choose the appropriate values. This is
comparable with the interface found in many database applications.
6. The ES should be developed such that it can easily be expanded, augmented,
repaired, changed, and maintained. For that purpose a modular system seems the
best approach.
7. The ES should be tested in phases. After informal tests during the development, a
formal test should be set up using other cases than those used during development.
The formal test should have a design that is comparable with that used to assess the
agreement between human raters.
Furthermore, the level of performance required from the system must be decided
on before the experiments starts. We would like to stress the importance of a
thorough and rigorous evaluation of the ES. As the ES is developed to be given a
responsible role in a difficult medical field, it is only natural that its performance is
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tested in the same rigorous manner as humans are before they are allowed to use
their skills in daily routine.
Because the evaluation of ESs deserves a more elaborated discussion than is
possible here, the next chapter will be devoted to this subject.
Although these aims will not guarantee that a useful ES will emerge, it will make it
likely that previous problems will be avoided and that -in contrast to many ESs
developed sofar- the resulting ES will go beyond the stage of a research or
demonstration prototype.
7 REFERENCES
1. Yudofsky SC, Hales RE. The reemergence of neuropsychiatry: definition and
direction. J Neuropsychiatry, 1989, 1; 1: 1-6
2. Lighthill J. Artificial Intelligence: a general survey. In: Flowers BH (Ed.)
Artificial Intelligence: a Paper Symposium. London Science Research Council,
1973, pp 1-21.
3. Department of Industry. A programme for advanced information technology:
the report of the Alvey Committee. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1982.
4. Lam, M. Lighthill 17 years on. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 1990, 5;
4: 265-276.
5. Michie D. Lighthill 17 years on: end of a shotgun divorce. The Knowledge
Engineering Review, 1990, 5; 4: 277-284.
6. Jackson P. Reply to Lam. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 1990, 5; 4: 285.
7. Wilks Y. Al and Anglo-Saxon Attitudes: a response to Martin Lam. The
Knowledge Engineering Review, 1990, 5; 4: 285-288.
8. McCarthy J. Lessons from the Lighthill Flap. The Knowledge Engineering
Review, 1990, 5; 4: 288-290.
9. Sparck Jones K. Re Lam: Lighthill 17 years on. The Knowledge Engineering
Review, 1990, 5; 4: 290.
10. Lam M. A Rejoinder. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 1990, 5; 4: 290-293.
11. Waterman D. A Guide to Expert Systems. Addison-Wesley, Reading,
Massachusetts, 1986.
12. Hayes-Roth F, Waterman DA, Lenat D. (Eds.) Building Expert Systems.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1983.
13. Churchland PM, Smith Churchland P. Could a Machine Think? Scientific
American. January 1990: 26-31.
14. Searle JR. Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? Scientific American.
January 1990: 20-25.
Evince 11
15. Minsky M. A framework for representing knowledge. In: P.H. Winston (Ed.)
The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York, MacGraw-Hill, 1975, pp.
211-277.
16. Tanimoto SL, The Elements of Artificial Intelligence. Computer Science Press,
Rockville, Maryland, 1987, p. 130.
17. Buchanan B, Shortliffe EH. (Eds.) Rule-Based Expert Systems. The MYCIN
experiments of the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project. Addison-Wesley,
New York, 1984.
18. Heiser JF, Brooks RE. Design considerations for a clinical pharmacology
advisor. Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Conference on Computer
Applications in Medical Care, Washington, November 1978, pp. 278-285.
19. Mulsant B, Servan-Schreiber D. Knowledge engineering: a daily activity on a
hospital ward. Computers and Biomedical Research, 1984; 17: 71-91.
20. Feinberg M, Lindsay RK. Expert Systems in Psychiatry. Psychopharmacology
Bulletin. 1986, 22; 1: 311-316.
21. Werner G. Methuselah: An Expert System for Diagnosis in Geriatric
Psychiatry. Computers and Biomedical Research, 1987; 20: 477-488.
22. Brooks RE, Heiser JF. Transferability of a rule-based control structure to a
new knowledge domain. Proceeding of the 3rd Annual Conference on
Computer Applications in Medical Care. Washington, 1979, pp. 56-63.
23. Servan-Schreiber D. Artificial Intelligence and Psychiatry. The Journal of
Nervous and Mental Disease. 1986, 174; 4: 191-202.
24. Horvitz EJ, Heckerman DE, Nathwani BN, Fagan LM. Diagnostic strategies in
the hypothesis-directed PATHFINDER system. Proceedings of the lst
Conference on Artificial Intelligence Applications. IEEE Computer Society,
1984, pp. 630-636.
25. Morelli RA, Bronzino JD, Goethe JW. Expert Systems in Psychiatry. Journal of
Medical Systems. 1987, 11; 2/3: 157-168.
26. Reggia J. A production rule system for neurological localization. Proceedings
of the Second Annual Symposium on Computer Applications in Medical
Care. Piscataway, New Jersey, IEEE Press, November 1978, pp 254-260.
27. Xiang Z, Srihari SN, Shapiro SC, Chutkow JG. Analogical and propositional
representations of structure in neurological diagnosis. Proceedings of the First
Conference on Artificial Intelligence Applications, IEEE Computer Society,
December 1984.

Evince 13
II EVALUATION OF MEDICAL EXPERT SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
Although expert systems (ESs) are being developed during more than 2 decades, the
evaluation of such systems has received much less attention by developers than topics
such as inference techniques, knowledge acquisition and knowledge representation. In
1987, Lundsgaarde reported that only about 10% of the ESs developed until then were
subjected to evaluation tests.' As stated in the previous chapter, this is probably due
to the specific interest of ES developers in Al topics. Furthermore, Wyatt and
Spiegelhalter2 suggest that the sparsity of evaluation studies can also be explained by
the lack of paradigms for ES evaluation, making developers uncertain about what to
test, and which methods to employ. Although this problem applies to the evaluation
of any ES, it is especially true for ESs in the domain of medicine, where it can be very
difficult to assess the truth of a judgment. Although there is general agreement that
medical ESs, like any other new technology in medical care, should be formally tested
before being released for practical medical use, none of the existing evaluation
methods seem to fit the problem of ES evaluation very well. For example, as noted by
Wasson et a13, Wyatt4, and Wyatt and Spiegelhalter2, there is a close analogy between
the laboratory testing phase of ESs and the safety and dose-finding phases of drug
development. However, Wyatt and Spiegelhalters also point out that there are
i mportant differences, for example, the difficulty to obtain gold standards for
comparison. Another analogy exists between the evaluation of conventional software
and ESs. b However, this analogy faces the problem that ES decisions are not only
computational difficult -if not impossible- to prove, but also that an ES's knowledge is
based on fallible human expertise. Furthermore, even though ESs are comparable to
conventional software in many respects, there is the danger that they will not be
treated as such by the potential users, as the phrases Artificial Intelligence and Expert
System suggest that such systems possess certain human capabilities. As Cole' notes
in an article on tort liability for such systems, this can lead to an over reliance on the
ES, so that the user will neglect his owrt judgement, intuition, and abstract reasoning.
In the remainder of this chapter we will discuss what the phases and topics of ES
evaluation are, the evaluation methods that can be used, and by which criteria ESs are
to be judged.
2 STAGES AND TOPICS OF EXPERT SYSTEM EVALUATION
In contrast to O'Leary et al. 8, who regard evaluation as an experimental field stage
next to validation and verification, we adhere to the interpretation of O'Keefe et al .9
(p.81) that evaluation is "a broader area seeking to assess an expert system's overall
value". In this view, ES validation, i.e., assessing whether the system does what it is
supposed to do, and knowledge base verification, i.e., assessing whether the system's
knowledge is correct, are both part of ES evaluation.
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What the topics of ES evaluation are is very much dependent on the proposed
structure of the life cycle of ES evaluation, i.e. from the very first ideas up to the final
use in medical practice. For example, the live-task framework proposed by Buchanan
et al. 1° includes only one task (the final) where testing is explicitly mentioned. The
same applies for the spiral life cycle model proposed by Boehm" that ends the
moment the ES becomes operational. Wyatt 4, on the other hand, proposed a cycle
resembling the drug development cycle, which includes several test phases, up to the
final stage where an accredited decision support system is available on the market. As
exemplified by these three life cycle proposals, there are three principal phases in the
ES life cycle: the initial development, laboratory, and field testing phase. This is
reflected in the three-stage evaluation method proposed by Wyatt and Spiegelhalter2,
a modification of Wyatt's drug development paradigm, consisting of a definition or
prototype development phase, a laboratory testing phase, and a field testing phase. As
we believe that the proposed modification of the drug paradigm by Wyatt and
Spiegelhalter is the most useful and complete at present, we will use it as a starting
point to combine their ideas with other topics and evaluation methods. In our
discussion we will focus on Stage II, the laboratory evaluation, because many ESs have
either not reached this stage or have been tested unsatisfactorily. The other two stages
will mainly be discussed to suggest which types of tests do not belong at Stage II.
2.1 Stage I: Prototype development and evaluation
Although Wyatt and Spiegelhalter did not mention it in their article, the main topic of
evaluation during Stage I, after defining the ES's domain, is the verification of the
knowledge base. Verification deals with checking the knowledge base for correctness,
consistency, and completeness. Several methods have been proposed for knowledge
base verification. For example, the decision tables proposed by Suwa et al .12, and the
categorical inferences by Quinlan.13 However, most of these verification methods are
designed to verify only the parameter values of production rules. Recently, Liu et
al. 14
 proposed the use of numerical Petri nets, based on Zisman's 15 earlier
suggestion to use Petri nets to model relationships in production systems. Especially
the proposal by Liu et al. to use numerical Petri nets (NPNs) seems very promising, as
the use of these nets can be automated relatively easy. Unfortunately, it is too early to
expect experience reports about the use of NPNs. The main problem with verification
methods is that they are meant for a specific knowledge representation design and
need (substantial) modification to be useful for systems with a hybrid knowledge
representation. The use of demons (see also I 3.3), for example, is not represented in
the NPNs of Liu et al. This is probably one of the reasons why knowledge base
verification usually receives even less attention than knowledge base validation.
Fieschi16 calls the methods for this part of ES evaluation'static methods', as they do
not require running the system. However, there is an exception. An alternative is to
employ 'face verification', i.e., tracing the rulebase during numerous trial runs, and
examining the rules manually. Although this has the disadvantage that it is informal,
laboriously and error prone, it is probably the method used most often.
The possibilities to connect the system with other existing information systems is
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also an important subject, for example an interface to a patient database. However, the
diversity of systems used and the Jack of standardization severely impaires the
possibilities for integration of ESs with other information systems, unless the ES was
specifically designed for a certain configuration. However, care should be taken that
the ES's architecture is open enough to build interfaces for communication with other
information systems.
System speed is another important topic during this stage. From the beginning,
developers should try to optimize the system such that long periods of user inactivity
is avoided, and that the total time needed for a consultation is minimized. 17 The
transparency of the human-computer interface (HCI) and its sensitivity to human
errors are also important in that respect. A HCI is transparent when it is easy to use
and when it requires minimal instruction for operation, i.e., the HCI should guide the
user in the operation of the system. The sensitivity to human errors of the HCI can be
reduced by offering good information, checking answers for typing mistakes and
limiting the number of open-ended questions. In this respect, Boden's remark that "A
little common sense and a little natural language ability might be a very dangerous
thingi18'P- " is very important. Both transparency and human error sensitivity can be
tested through informal evaluations by asking clinicians who are unexperienced
computer users to operate the system with minimal instruction. 19 The testing of the
HCI should not be postponed until the system is completed, because then it is much
more difficult to change the design. However, HCI evaluation should neither be
limited to this first stage, the system's architecture should allow for some modification
of the HCI at later stages. Unfortunately, the use of a commercial expert system shell
can severely limit the degrees of freedom in HCI design, because some aspect of the
HCI will be determined by the shell and not by the developer. In that case, testing the
HCI also means that the suitability of the shell is tested. It should be stressed that, in
the end, the ease of use of an ES will be as important as the correctness of the ES's
conclusions.
An often forgotten topic of evaluation is the system's hardware requirement. Until
the advent of the personal computer most systems were developed using mini- or
mainframe computers. And even today, with powerful personal computers readily
available, there are ES developers who think, overhastily, that systems designed on
and for a personal computer must be inferior to those designed and running on a
mainframe or powerful workstation. However, the growth of the power of present
personal computers has virtually closed the gap between personal computers and
workstations. Due to the almost equivalent power of personal computers and work-
stations, the much less expensive personal computer has a clear advantage, as many
institutions that could benefit from ES technology do not have the financial resources
to invest in large computers. In this respect, the maintenance of the final system is of
importance. The knowledge base should be designed such that it can easily be
updated and modified. This can be tested during the subsequent evaluation stages
when the knowledge base is extended and modified. However, it should be
remembered that knowledge base maintenance is probably not done by the initial
developers, but by some central distributing company or organization.
Although not explicitly mentioned by any of the authors previously referred to,
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there is general consensus that if developers consider that the system performed well
on the informal tests during the first phase, and there is reason to believe that the
knowledge base is correct, consistent, and complete, then it is time for a formal
evaluation of the system.
2.2 Stage 1I: Formal laboratory evaluation
The main topic of Stage II is validation of the ES, i.e. the quality or assumed expertise
of the system. What should be validated is partly determined by the goal of the
system, i.e. whether it was intended to simulate or model the human expert. As
Fieschi16 notes, systems which simulate the reasoning of an expert should be judged on
their capacity to reach the same conclusions, while systems that model an expert
should additionally be judged on their inference method and reasoning chain. As most
ES developers would not claim that their system is a (realistic or complete) model of
the human expert, we will limit our validation discussion to the systems that simulate
human expertise. However, we would like to stress that there is a large grey area
between simulating and modelling human behaviour. Furthermore, before we
elaborate on how a simulation system can be validated, we would like to point out the
possibility to perform this validation phase in two steps.
2.2.1 Internal and External Validation
Although an ES could be built with the purpose to be used by a specific institution, i.e.
a custom designed system, the intention of most developers will be to deliver a system
that can and will be used by other institutions. It is therefore of the utmost importance
that the criteria used and the conclusions reached by the system will be acceptable
outside the place of development. One way to accomplish this is to use knowledge
that is widely agreed upon, i.e., consensus knowledge, such as the reports by
consensus meetings. 2° Additionally, it will be necessary to validate the ES by
comparing it with experts outside the institution of development. However, as
Bachant and McDermott2l note, expectations should not be too high during the first
few years of development. Consequently, immediately comparing a newly developed
ES with experts outside the institution of development should be avoided. A solution
to avoid this problem is to validate the system in two steps, where the first step would
be to compare the system with the expert(s) who served as domain expert(s) (the
internal comparison), and the second step to compare the system with experts from
outside the development institution (the external comparison). If the system fails to
meet the expectations of the first test, then there is no need to perform the -usually
more laborious and expensive- second test, while the chances of success will be higher
if the first step was completed successfully. Furthermore, performing both an internal
and an external comparision is useful to check whether the existence of schools of
thought is causing an ES to fail.
Evince 17
2.2.2 The Comparison Data
How such a validation must be performed is still a much debated topic. As evidenced
by our previous discussion on the use of human experts for comparison, we do not
consider (at present) equivalence tests between two systems on the same problem
domain a serious method for validation. At present (medical) ESs are still too
immature to be used as serious validation candidates. Medical ESs should first of all
show that they can accomplish what they were designed for: perform better than the
average human clinician who has to deal with the same problem domain.
The most common method of comparison is to use historie data, i.e., patient records,
and feed these into the system. The advantage of this method is that the data are
readily available and that the test can be performed quickly. This is important to
control the cost of validation .9
A second possibility is to set up a prospective experiment, using the data from newly
entered patients that are to be judged by the ES and the human expert at the same
time. However, this method is very time consuming and expensive, especially when
the type of patient required is relatively rare. An additional problem -which is not
restricted to prospective studies- is the difficulty to assess whether the collected data
are complete and correct. Because not all clinical findings can be objectively verified,
for example through autopsy, there is no definite solution to this problem.
A third option is to let experts synthesize cases along with the appropriate
diagnosis. However, as O'Keefe9<P - 83  notes, "this is problematic because any set of
synthesized cases is unlikely to represent a well-stratified sample". Apart from the
questionable quality of such cases, this method is also time consuming and expensive,
because it demands much time and effort from the medical experts.
Although the second option is probably methodologically the best because it
ensures a natural selection of cases that have to be dealt with by the human clinician,
for this stage (II) of evaluaton, there are important advantages in favor of the first
method, i.e., the use of historie data. By using historie data a time consuming and
expensive method in an early phase of development can be avoided. Furthermore,
these data can more easily be checked for completeness, and -although not with
absolute certainty- for their correctness before they are are used. The prospective
approach would be more suitable for stage III, when there is more certainty that the
system performs well enough to be tested outside laboratory settings.
2.2.3 The Number of Cases and Case Selection
The next question is how many cases, and which cases should be used in the
comparisons, i.e., the internal and external comparisons.
As to which cases should be used for comparison, it will be clear that only those cases
can be used that did not take part in any of the previous phases of system
development. Two options for case selection have been proposed: selected and
randomized patient cases. 9 '22 As each method has its pros and Gons, we suggest to
make a practical choice between the two options. For the internal comparison a
stratified, for example by complexity or diagnosis, randomized case selection seems
the most appropriate, because the cases to be used will probably be derived from the
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same institution where the system was developed. A stratified randomization will
avoid the problem that the domain expert (the human expert who cooperated in the
acquisition of the knowledge for the system) will have to choose the cases for
comparison. However, to test the sensitivity and specificity of the system, some
selection must be allowed to assure that there are both cases with a positive diagnosis
and cases with a negative diagnosis. Only when there are not enough cases available
the option of selected cases should be chosen.
For the external comparison, the stratified randomization would still be the best
option. However, here there is an additional problem. If the system is to be compared
with experts from many locations, then it will practically be very difficult -if not
impossible- to have all those clinicians diagnose many cases. In such circumstances,
only a small number of cases can be used, which eliminates the use of randomized
cases. A methodologically better approach in that situation is to use a carefully
selected sample of cases. This can affect our confidence in the test results, but as
O'Keefe et al .9 83 note "the law of large numbers simply does not apply here. The
issue is not the number of test cases, it is the coverage of the test cases". Additionally, the
problem of the number of test cases to be used is not restricted to the selected sample
cases, but also to the randomized sample cases. As Van Bemmel' (P - 193> notes "the
number of degrees of freedom is so large that (...) one would need many millions of
cases to test a sizable expert system". The number of available patient records alone,
makes this impossible.
2.2.4 Stress Testing
Another topic of validation is 'stress testing', i.e. testing whether the system produces
errors to certain combinations of data.` Although this is a very important topic, we
believe that the possibilities for stress testing are very limited during this stage of
system evaluation. To find such errors either synthesized cases based on hypotheses
about possible errors are required, which is unlikely to succeed due to the large
number of possible errors, or all possible combinations of parameters have to be
present in the cases, which is impossible. The best option at this stage would be to
select cases that are considered difficult by most experts, but then again this is not
quite what is meant by stress testing. The third system evaluation stage, when the
system is tested in field situations, is probably more suitable for stress testing, because
at that point more, and more realistic, unforeseen cases will have to be judged by the
system.
2.2.5 The Golden Standard
For both internal and external comparison there is the problem of the golden standard,
or: how should any diagnosis made be judged for correctness? For the internal
comparison we would like to simplify the problem by stating that the domain expert
is to be regarded as the golden standard. This can be justified by the fact that the
domain expert has also served as the model after which the ES was build.
Consequently, the ES is supposed to produce results comparable to its model.
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Incidentally, this approach can even be used when there is more than one domain
expert, except that the test may then produce more than one result.
For the external comparison the use of an existing or constructed golden standard is
imperative, since we are supposed to compare the system with many clinicians who's
diagnoses can differ in varying degrees from the domain expert. Probably the best
solution is to have cases that contain post mortem data that confirm the clinical
diagnoses. However, such cases are difficult to obtain. Furthermore, as stated before,
not all clinical diagnoses can -or even have to- be confirmed by post mortem data. In
such cases some authority in the domain must serve as a golden standard. We suggest
that a committee be formed consisting of experts who are internationally considered
as experts in the domain. When the expertise of several disciplines is involved, then
the choice of experts should cover these disciplines. For example, in dementia
diagnostics it is recognized that the opinion of psychiatrists, neurologists and
psychologists should be taken into account.
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 Furthermore, this expert committee
should be able to form an opinion through joint discussion to obtain an optimal result.
Such a committee provides an upper limit for system performance. To obtain a lower
limit, other clinicans with which to compare the system should be selected at random,
or at the least form a rough average sample. Thus, the upper and lower limit yield the
acceptable performance range mentioned by O'Keefe et al. 9, where the upper limit
represents the desired system performance, while the lower limit represents the
threshold for rejection or acceptance of the system. To be more specific, if the system
performs at par with the average clinician, then the system should be rejected, because
it was supposed to perform at expert level. However, it should be noted that unless an
ES performs at par with the best clinician, "...it can be expected to have a negative
influence on some of them", because the clinician could be deceived by the
suggestions of the system 16(P.98)
2.2.6 Obtaining and Judging the Diagnoses
To acquire the diagnoses from the clinicians for comparison with the ES, the clinicians
and the ES should have the same data available in a structured way. This could lead to
a'checklist effect', i.e. a positive effect on decision making because more complete and
structured data than normally is the case are available. Furthermore, because the
quality and quantity of the information given to the clinicians in this setup, is likely to
be superior to the information that is usually available to them, it is plausible to
assume that this makes the test more demanding of the ES, because the clinicians are
better informed than usual 2 Furthermore, the clinicians should be allowed to state
their diagnoses in a way that does not restrict the terminology they use. This is
especially important when clinicians from several disciplines participate in the study.
To judge the diagnoses from both the ES and the clinicians, O'Keefe et al. 9 suggest to
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use a kind of Turing test. ` In this test the diagnoses of both the clinicians and the ES
are being judged by other clinicians, while being blinded for the source of the
diagnoses. Although blinded experiments are common practice for the drug
evaluation paradigm, in this case it has a serious flaw, because it assumes that the
answers of the clinicians and the ES are linguistically indistinguishable. At least for the
present, this assumption must be considered unrealistic, unless the diagnoses from
both sources were transformed such to make identification impossible. However, it is
unlikely that such a liguistic tranformation can be done reliably. A better approach
would be to categorize all diagnoses and use some statistical measurement of
agreement, for example, Cohen's Kappa 25 . However, in some cases, for example in
the external validation with many clinicians and only few cases, the judgement will
probably be done qualitatively with only some descriptive statistics as proportions
and averages.
2.3 Stage III: Field evaluation
After an ES proves to be successful during the previous laboratory tests, the system
will be ready to be tested in field circumstances. This stage is probably the most
laborious and expensive due to the number of participants involved and the time
needed for the evaluation. The nature of a field evaluation study is that a quasi
experiment is performed in a situation that includes independent environmental
variables (confounding variables) that were not present in the laboratory tests, such as
attitude towards computers or time pressure. Furthermore, unwanted experimental
effects can occur in a field study, for example, the problem of (observer) interference
with the observed clinicians: the so called'Hawthorn effect r26. Another effect is more
specifie to the use of ESs in the experiment, i.e., the carry-over-effect. This is the
educational effect that the ES can have on the clinicians who use the system. Contrary
to the drug evaluation paradigm it is impossible to use a placebo. However, as Wyatt
and Spiegelhalter2 suggest this effect can be partly controlled for by alternating
periods where the clinicians work with and without the ES, and by measuring the
clinicians performance prior to the experiment. For these experimental problems
educational research methods can prove very helpful.
As mentioned before, the most suitable experiment for this stage is a prospective
study. However, before such a lengthy study is started an other retrospective study is
possible. Such a study would be performed by external clinicians, using their own
patient records, preferably patients of whom the clinical data are supplemented, if
relevant, with data from an autopsy. In this way several topics can be examined at the
• In order to show that a computer is capable of imitating human intelligence, A.M. Turing
designed a test in which a subject behind a teletype console can communicate with a second
teletype console in another room. The second teletype console can either be operated by a
human or a computer. The subject's task is to find out whether he is communicating with a
computer or a human being by asking questions. If the subject is unable to teil who he is
communicating with while he has been communicating with a computer, then the computer
passed the test.
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same time: the validity of the system using patient records containing data that were
collected in a different way, the stability of the system, and the effectiveness of the
HCI. Furthermore, during this experiment the trial run-in period mentioned by Wyatt
and Spiegelhalter2 can be performed.
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As we have stated before, we have focussed on the methodological issues of the Stage
II evaluation, a stage that has been underrated by most developers. Consequently,
most systems did not even come close to the field evaluation of Stage III (one
exception is INTERNIST-I27). The depreciation or underestimated difficulty of ES
evaluation is reflected in many of the reports about new ESs, which give only scanty
details on, for example, the evaluation methods, the cases used, and the people
involved. Therefore, when the goal of ES development is to produce an ES for prac-
tical use, future reports on ES development should pay at least as much attention -and
maybe even more- to evaluation studies as to knowledge acquisition or system
architecture. Like medical drugs, or psychological tests, ES evaluation is essential in
order to prove their usefulness. In this respect, a policy change of the publication
journals involved might be required, because ES evaluation experiments will typically
be interdisciplinary studies, involving both knowledge engineers and domain experts.
Given the number of tests and the people involved, we can also conclude that the
amount of time to be invested in ES evaluation is gravely underestimated. Previously
knowledge acquisition was seen as the bottleneck in ES development. Now it seems
that there is another bottleneck, one that is probably even more costly than the
knowledge acquisition phase. The European project for Common Standards for
Quantitative Electrocardiography provides good impression about how expensive and
complicated the evaluation of information systems is 2 8 Therefore, it seems obvious
that Stage III evaluations cannot be performed without the financial support of
institutions that can take over the financial and commercial responsibility of the
system after it has proven its value in the laboratory. Given this commercial interest,
and the multitude of difficulties of ES evaluation, it is important that an independent
technology assessment body is formed to judge (among others) decision support
systems, since there is no principal difference between the evaluation of ESs, new
drugs, or even the examination of medical students `
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III ACQUAINT*
1 INTRODUCTION
In 1987 the Department of Neuropsychology and Psychobiology of the University of
Limburg started the development of an expert system with the name'Evince', for the
differential diagnosis of dementia' The goal of developing Evince was to integrate
and formalize international criteria and examination procedures, and to aid non-
expert clinicians in diagnosing dementia and its possible causes.
As the expert system was also meant to be used in small health care institutions, the
decision was made to use a micro computer based expert system shell. Furthermore,
the shell had to be able to manage uncertainty, have a quasi natural language type of
knowledge representation for easier understanding by the user, and a reasonably
good explanation facility. After a careful comparison of the shells available early 1987,
we decided to use the expert system shell Acquaint". Z In the remainder of this paper
we will review the most important features of Acquaint, and report some of our
experiences with this shell.
2 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
In common Artificial Intelligence terms, the knowledge of an expert system is divided
into declarative and procedural knowledge, where the declarative knowledge is
comprised of data and rules, while procedural knowledge stands for the procedural
programming language routines. In Acquaint knowledge is represented in the form of
frames of which there are 6 types, i.e., RuleBase, Context, Rule, Concept, Function, and
Form frames. Each frame consists of a name for identification and one or more slots
with an accompanying value facet. With the exception of the Function frames, these
frames comprise the usual declarative knowledge. However, the Function frame
encompasses both declarative and procedural knowledge. Therefore, in the remainder
of this thesis we will label knowledge consisting of rules as Procedural Knowledge
(PK) and knowledge about data -including the Function frame- as Conceptual
Knowledge (CK) 3
Parts of this chapter were published in Plugge LA. Acquaint. Expert Systems, 1990, 7; 4: 243-245.
Acquaint is an expert system development tool for the IBM compatible personal computer
developed by Lithp Systems BV, Purmerend The Netherlands. The version reviewed in this
chapter was release 3.25.
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2.1 Procedural Knowledge
Procedural knowledge in Acquaint is hierarchically ordered in three frames. The
highest ordered frame is the RuleBase frame, which defines the knowledge modules
that are used in the application. A knowledge module is a file containing PK and/or
CK. Knowledge modules are for the convenience of the developer to modularize the
knowledge base, and have no special meaning to the user, or the system. The second
frame type is the Context frame, which is used to structure the problem domain into a
hierarchical tree of topics to be investigated. Each Context definition is a rule to group
(DefContext ALCOHOL-ABUSE
IN: PHYSIOLOGY
COMMENT: There is reason to investigate the
possibility of alcohol abuse when one of
the following statements is true:
IF: $OR (PresentAlcoholUse / 7) » 3
(FormerAlcoholUse / 7) » 3
AF = 'increased
OT = 'increased
PT = 'increased
Gamma-GT = 'increased)
Table 1. Definition of a Context.
subordinate rules and other Contexts, and has the function of a meta rule.
Subordinated rules are simply enumerated under the Context to which they belong,
while a subcontext has an IN-slot which mentions its supercontext. For example, the
context'ALCOHOL-ABUSE' in Table 1 is triggered when the patient regularly
consumes more than 3 glasses of alcohol per day, or when one of the other parameters
has the value'increased'. The operator'»' ('moving toward the higher bound') is one
of the available quasi fuzzy operators, and uses the number 3 to determine an interval
with a 20% higher and lower bound and fits the amount of alcohol the patient
consumes within these bounds. The degree of fit is expressed as a certainty factor, in
this case the higher the alcohol consumption the higher the fit and certainty factor.
(Due to the small interval in this example the operator'>' would be sufficient in most
cases. However, as the amount is calculated from the weekly use it thus able to
differentiate between small deviations upward.) The main advantage of this contex-
tual representation of PK is its modular structure, which makes it relatively easy to
add or rearrange knowledge by moving an entire context, without the need to change
individual rules. During the development of Evince this proved to be a very efficient
way to implement new knowledge.
The third frame type is the Rule frame, the basic element of the PK. (See Table 2) The
IF slot of the Rule frame allows the use of several rule properties. For example, the
properties FORWARD or BACKWARD inform the system whether a rule can be used
in forward or backward reasoning. Furthermore, the usual booleans, i.e., AND, OR,
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and NOT can be used, with additional
(DefRule <Rule Name> directions on how to use the certainties of the
IF:
 <Rule Property> antecedents of a rule. For example, the
<Boolean><condition> boolean OR* forces the inference engine to
<condition>
evaluate all premises after which the
THEN: <action> combined certainty of these premises is
ELSE: <action> calculated (how this is done is discussed
GOAL: <hypothesis>) below). Unfortunately, Acquaint does not
allow combinations of the AND and OR
Table 2. Definition of a Rule. boolean within one antecedent part of a rule.
Although this is not uncommon (for example,
in NEXPERT only AND rules are allowed), it
does impair readability to some extent because it requires the use of several rules. One
additional quasi-boolean is MAYBE, which uses the certainty of its premises only
when they are above a certainty of .2, otherwise they are ignored. This boolean has
proven itself very useful to check the patient's data for atypical symptoms.
The conditions in the IF slot can test the value of concepts with a large set of
operators, like: 'equal to' (=), 'smaller than' (<),'TRUE','KNOWN', and quasi fuzzy
operators, like: 'approximately equal to' (' ), and the previously discussed 'moving
toward the higher bound' (»).
The consequent part of rules in Acquaint offers more possibilities then can be found in
most other shells, i.e., the usual THEN part, but also an ELSE and a GOAL part. The
THEN and the ELSE slots usually consist of a certainty factor (CF), ranging between -
100 and 100, with the name of a concept and the value to be asserted. However, a
whole range of other actions can be performed, like message transmission, or window
handling. In contrast to the THEN statement, the ELSE statement will only be
activated when the IF statement is not true. When the truth of the IF statement is
undetermined, i.e. a CF between -20 and 20, then neither the THEN nor the ELSE
statement will be executed.
The GOAL part is a new feature of Acquaint's latest release and is best compared
with the IF slot of a rule. After the IF statement of a rule is proved to be true, then the
GOAL slot is treated as a second IF statement to be proved. However, in contrast to
the IF-statement, the GOAL-statement orders the inference engine to examine the
entire rulebase, and not just the present context. The concept mentioned in this slot is
treated by the inference engine as new hypothesis to be proved, just as the usual IF
statements. The GOAL part of a rule gives the inference engine the powerful
capability to focus on a specific diagnosis given that the conditions in the IF statement
are true.
The type of boolean in the antecedent part of a rule determines how the CF of a rule
is calculated, but generally the AND boolean returns the lowest CF, while the OR
boolean takes the highest CF. The CF in the consequent part of the rule denotes the
maximum certainty with which the conclusion can de drawn. The algorithm to
calculate CFs is the same as the one implemented in MYCIN (See Table 3)4
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Given CFI and CF2:
If both are positive:
CF = CFI + Cf2 (1- CFI)
If both are negative:
CF=0-(ICFII + ICF21 (1- ICF1I))
If one is negative:
CF = (CFI + CF2) / (1 - MIN(I CFI 1,1 CF2 t))
Tahla 3 CPrtainty Fartnr
2.2 Conceptual Knowledge
There are three types of CK frames: the Concept, the Function, and the Form frame.
The Concept is the most fundamental CK frame in Acquaint. The number of available
slots in a Concept frame is fixed, i.e. you can not define your own slots. Nevertheless,
there is still sufficient flexibility with regard to the use and implementation of the
slots. Table 4 shows an example of a Concept definition in Evince. The EXPECT slot
can handle several types of answers, like VALUE (choose one value), VALUES (choose
one or more values), RANGE, and CON VERT (converts numbers in text and visa
versa). Although Acquaint offers the possibility to define new EXPECT functions to
proces answers, we have found the available functions sufficient for our purpose.
(DefConcept EEG
FACT: Electroencephalogram
PROMPT: Which deviations have been found in the EEG
COMMENT: If the deviation you found is not included in the list, then choose 'un-
known'.
EXPECT: VALUES none unknown diffuse_slowing focal_pathology
increased_Beta-activity epileptic_activity
VAL: (<value><certainty>)
DEFAULT: none
CLASS: <parent concept>
PROP: ASK)
Fable 4.
The PROP (property) slot informs the system whether it is allowed to ask the value
(ASK), whether it has to recalculate the concept value (CALC), and whether the value
of the concept is a CF or a value-CF pair. The CLASS slot handles the inheritance of
slot values.
The use of Function frames is difficult to explain, because they can serve almost any
kind of purpose. However, their main purpose is to serve concepts and rules, for
example, as procedures for calculation or message transmission.
The Form frame serves as a fill-in form with dynamic links to the concepts used in
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it, and is used to circumvent tedious queries by providing the user a form with default
values which can be edited. The frame itself does not contain conceptual or procedural
knowledge, it merely manages the display of the CK and tells the system whether or
not the data should be used instantly or not. In Evince forms are used, for example, to
enter administrative data and the results of laboratory blood tests.
2.3 Reasoning
The inference engine (IE) traces the context tree depth first, and compiles a priority
list (an agenda) of the rules for each context. This agenda is setup for each context
when it is visited. The priority of a rule is based on several criteria, for example, the
priority of an OR-rule is higher than an AND-rule. The rules on the agenda are then
traced by forward chaining, until all rules have been tried. The rules that did not fire
are then evaluated by backward chaining. Only during backward chaining is the IE
allowed to ask questions about concepts. This switching between forward and
backward chaining can be suppressed by setting a global reasoning switch to
backward, i.e., only backward reasoning is allowed, or forward. Additionally, local
forward and backward reasoning switches can be put in individual rules. When a rule
fires, the total amount of certainty of the IF part of that rule is taken as a percentage of
the certainty in the rule's conclusion. For example, if a rule fires with 80% certainty,
and a concept in the THEN part has a CF of 90, then that conciusion will receive a CF
of 72. The IE raises or lowers the certainty of a concept when an other rule has the
same concept in its THEN part, by combining the previous CF with the new CF using
the formulas from Table 3.
Reasoning continues until the last context within the root context has been traced. A
context will be checked only once. To check a context for a second time, the IE must be
explicitly instructed to do so. Apart from hierachically ordered contexts, Acquaint
offers the possibility to use isolated contexts, i.e. contexts that are no part of the root
context. This feature makes it possible to have two separate knowledge bases within
one system.
3 INTERFACE
Due to the character based user interface Acquaint appears rather dull.
Nevertheless, although Acquaint is visually less impressive than competing shells
with graphic user interfaces, it has the advantage that it does not overwhelm the user
with a labyrinth of windows.
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3.1 Development Interface
Acquaint does not offer a very friendly development interface. The knowledge base
has to be edited with a Lisp oriented editor, or some other straight ASCII editor.'
However, the explain and tracing options in Acquaint are good and the compiler has
a sensitive debugger that provides informative error messages, which makes it
relatively easy to trace faults. Acquaint contains a large number example knowledge
bases which explain many of Acquaint's features. Although it is not required to be a
Lisp programmer to implement these examples, we have found that at least some
basic knowledge of Lisp is certainly of advantage.
3.2 User Interface
Acquaint provides the user with several menu driven options to query the system
during a consultation. For example, the user can ask why a question was asked, how
values were inferred, and which concepts are known. A trace option allows the user to
get a detailed picture of the reasoning chain of the IE, i.e., which rules or contexts fired
or failed and in what sequence. The communication is done via specific windows, like
INFO windows for message transmission, and the STATUS window for query and
answering, and to display the present hypothesis and context under consideration.
The use of function keys and other keys is very consistent, and their amount is very
limited, which makes it easy to remember them. The answers entered by the user are
checked by a simple spelling checker by matching it with the possible answers,
making the system very forgiving for typos and spelling errors. We have found that
the end user needs very little instruction to operate a ready to run expert system
developed with Acquaint.
3.3 System Performance
One serious drawback of Acquaint is that the muLISP" interpreter can not address
extended or expanded memory. Nevertheless, Acquaint loads the entire knowledge
base into its standard memory. This limits the size of the knowledge base
considerably. Lithp Systems has acknowledged this problem and developed a new
version (4.0) of Acquaint that uses virtual memory. However, this version has not
been released yet.
The speed of run time versions, considering that the system is implemented in LISP,
is reasonably fast when used on a personal computer with micro processor of the 808X
family. For developers a personal computer with a 80286 or 80386 micro processor is
recommended.
• This does not apply for Micro Acquaint, a beginners version of Acquaint, which is completely
menu driven.
muLISP is a trademark of the Soft Warehouse.
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4 CONCLUSION
Although Acquaint has some drawbacks (i.e., the size of the knowledge base, the
lack of a graphical user interface, and the limited options for development), it does
present a powerful tool for professional expert system development for personal
computers. Acquaint is financially attractive, because Lithp System does not charge
runtime royalties. Other strong points of Acquaint are its clear user interface, the
contextual structure for the procedural knowledge, its reasoning with certainty factors
and its open architecture. The manual is well written and the example files provide a
good source of information on the available options and behavior of the system.
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IV DEVELOPMENT OF EVINCE:
AN EXPERT SYSTEM FOR THE DIAGNOSIS OF DEMENTIA
1 INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of expert system (ES) research, medicine has been a major field of
interest as a source of human expertise, in order to demonstrate that Artificial
Intelligence (Al) techniques made it possible to simulate generally acknowledged
intelligent human behaviour with the aid of a computer. As general human
intelligence was (and still is) far too complex to be simulated by a computer, ES
research focussed on fields of human expertise that were considered to encompass
relatively small, highly specialized and well defined domains. Medicine, with its
specialized disciplines was judged to be one of them. Consequently, some of the first
and best known ESs contained medical expertise, e.g., INTERNIST', CASNET 2 and
MYCIN3. Since then there has been a steady increase of applications on a wide range
of medical subjects. The CRI Directory of Expert Systems4 -using a broad definition of
ESs- lists 145 medical applications in all kinds of developmental stages. However, only
a few medical ESs moved beyond the level of a research (demonstration) prototype.
Waterman5 lists 46 medical applications that are in the research or demonstration
stage, and only 7 in the field or production stage.
There are several possible causes for this gap between development, and field or
experimental utilization. One cause is the interest of the ES researchers in developing
new Al techniques, rather than in the practical use of an application. This emphasis on
Al techniques is reflected in the scanty attention given to performance evaluations. A
second reason for the discrepancy, is the use of expensive hardware. This is due to the
high computational performance which is required for symbolic reasoning. This
hardware is usually not available outside the laboratory, which makes prototypes less
suitable for field testing. The fact that the performance of new hardware steadily
increases does not reduce the problem, because the performance demands increase
likewise. A third reason is the misconception that medical knowledge is equally well
defined as the problems it addresses. Although the amount of medical knowledge -
including the topics of consensus- is large, there is still an abundance of uncertain
knowledge and disagreement, both within and between disciplines. This uncertainty
and lack of consensus poses great difficulties in developing and evaluating medical
ESs, as was shown by Buchanan and Shortliffe when they developed MYCIN.b
Furthermore, although medical specialists commonly practice in a monodisciplinary
manner, they also have -and are expected to have- knowledge of related disciplines in
order to be able to judge whether or not to refer the patient, or to consult a member
from another discipline. However, the knowledge of the ESs developed so far is
usually restricted to one discipline in order to simplify the problem and to reduce the
amount of conflicting knowledge. Unfortunately, such simplification does not only
hamper the quality of ESs, it also reduces one of the most valuable aspects of (medical)
ESs: their potential to spread expertise among a large audience of clinicians within
related disciplines. Moreover, ESs can play an important role in making knowledge
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accessible for discussion because ES development requires the explicitation of the
knowledge involved. Therefore, ES development should not be restricted to clearly
defined areas of expertise or one specialism on a domain.
With this in mind the ES EVINCE for the domain of dementia diagnostics was
developed. EVINCE was implemented on a simple personal computer (IBM PC/XT
compatible) using a commercial expert system development tool (ESDT), and contains
multi-disciplinary expertise from such diverse disciplines as neurology, psychiatry,
and neuropsychology. In two experiments the performance of EVINCE was compared
with the neuropsychiatric domain expert, three prominent experts from three
disciplines and 85 clinicians from 5 disciplines. The first experiment revealed a
moderate to high level of agreement between EVINCE and the domain expert on the
major diagnoses (See chapter V).' In the second experiment it was shown that the
improved and expanded version of EVINCE produced better results than the average
clinician, and performed at par with the three experts (See chapter Vu) . 8 On the basis
of the results of these evaluations, Evince can be considered to be one of the few
medical ESs that have left not only the prototype or demonstration stage, but allo the
laboratory stage.
As the evaluations have shown that the performance of Evince was at an expert
level and that such a system can be implemented on a simple personal computer, it
was deemed of importance to provide a more detailed description for development of
ESs in similar domains. The description will concern itself with the problem domain,
the materials and methods used during development, and the architecture of the
system.
2 DOMAIN DEFINITION
Dementia diagnostics is a typical example of a medical domain where knowledge
from different disciplines, notably, neurology and psychiatry, has to be integrated in
order to make a reliable diagnosis. This multi-disciplinary approach is due to the
nature of the dementia syndrome, which manifests itself through both physiological
and behavioral changes in the patient. In recent years, the knowledge of dementia
diagnostics and causes of dementia has increased steadily, and has led to an increased
level of consensus on the diagnostic criteria. Nevertheless, this increased knowledge
seems to have penetrated daily practice only partly and appears to be difficult to
apply for the average clinician due to the multidisciplinary approach required.9a0a'
Furthermore, differences were found between disciplines in their diagnoses. For
example, neurologists and psychiatrists differed significantly in their etiological
diagnoses when presented with the same patient case descriptions." However, it
should be remembered that dementia is only a small part of the medical problems
encountered by the disciplines mentioned before. Although one can expect that a
clinician is informed about new developments in his or her own field, it is unrealistic
to expect the same level of expertise for related disciplines.
There are over 50 different known causes of dementia, of which three causes are the
most prominent: Dementia of Alzheimer Type (DAT), Multiple-infarct Dementia
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(MID), and depression-induced dementia. 12
 Of these, DAT is the most difficult to
identify, because it is predominantly characterized by exclusion criteria, i.e., if non of
the other causes can be found responsible, then DAT is possible or probable. However,
the definite diagnosis DAT can only be made on the basis of both clinical and post-
mortem findings. An additional complicating factor is that several diagnoses may
coexist, for example, the diagnosis DAT and vascular problems can be found simulta-
neously, producing the diagnosis MIX. 13
 Thus, the search for the dementing cause
asks for a complete examina tion of all possible causes, while postponing the decision
for the diagnosis DAT until last.
The task for the clinician, and thus for the ES, is threefold: firstly, a decision has to
be made on the question whether or not a dementia syndrome is present, i.e., whether
the cluster of symptoms and physiological measures is characteristic for dementia.
Secondly, a variety of neurological signs and other somatic and behavioral indices has
to be searched for, and thirdly, a decision about the etiology of the dementia
syndrome has to be made. The first task meant that the expert system would have to
be able to exclude some of the other syndromes which resemble dementia, and be able
to report this if it could not achieve that. That is, the ES should have some knowledge
outside the domain. The second task implied that the ES should gather information
about the etiology and the third task meant that the ES had to decide which cause was
most likely, whether there were alternative causes, contradictions, or several causes
acting together.
3 MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1 Starting-points
There were five factors with important consequences for the development method'
chosen.
The first factor was the decision to build a small prototype within a short time for
feasibility assessment. This excluded the use of an elaborated knowledge acquisi tion
approach, like the (in 1987) emerging'Knowledge Acquisition Documentation and
Structuring' method (KADS), which requiers "a full analysis of data (...) before any
design and implementa tion". 14 24^
The second factor was the decision to develop and implement the ES on a simple
IBM compatible personal computer. Thus, avoiding the need to port the system from
a workstation, minicomputer or mainframe, with the problem of scaling the system
down for personal computer use.
The third factor affecting the development method was the decision to use a
commercial expert system development tool (ESDT) to achieve a further reduc tion of
development time. A further requirement was that the ESDT would be suitable for use
To avoid confusion, we use Jackson's15 distinction between 'method', i.e., "a way of doing
something", and 'methodology', i.e., "the study of method". Here a method is discussed, not a
methodology.
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on a personal computer. A drawback of such an approach is that it could force a
reduction of the problem to fit the ESDT chosen. However, at the start of the project
there were several commercial ESDTs available, offering the opportunity to choose the
one best suited for the problem at hand.
The fourth factor was the domain of dementia diagnostics. Although the choice of
the development method and the knowledge acquisition are discussed separately, in
reality they were very much intertwined. Analysis of the domain showed that a
structured clinical protocol was used which was partly documented, i.e. a checklist
and the diagnostic criteria to be used, and partly a mental protocol. The laffer part, i.e.,
the mental protocol, consisted of rather discrete steps about when to apply which
criteria, which data should be used, and what procedure should be used in applying
the criteria. Each of these decision steps produced their own diagnoses and/or -
conclusions, terminated by a final evaluation by the clinician to make a concluding
report with diagnoses.
The fifth factor was the decision to use a top-down development approach and to
design a modular system. A modular design would make it easier to expand
(breadthwise development) and refine (depthwise development) the system at later
stages.
3.2 Development Method
Given the aforementioned starting points, an iterative prototyping Life-Cycle Model
(LCM) using incremental implementation seemed to fit these starting points
best. 15,16•17 Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the development method
used. The development method consisted of 6 consecutive stages, proceeding in a
top-down fashion, each with the possibility to return to a previous stage. Usually, the
early stages of top-down development deal with many unknowns, because there is no
knowledge about the final model.` In such a case a bottom-up method is more useful.
However, the situation is very different for expert system development where the
system is not designed from scratch, but extracted from the domain expert's mind.
Although human experts cannot always explain in detail how they handle problems in
their domain, most of the time they do have a general idea, i.e. a mental protocol, of
their approach and the information involved. It is the task of the knowledge engineer
to extract this protocol and to convert it into a computer model. This means that expert
system development centers around explicitating the expert's (mental) model. For this
reason it was thought that a top-down development method was more appropriate
than a bottom-up approach. In our case it meant using the expert's knowledge to
implement the available paper and mental protocol used by the department of
Neuropsychology & Psychobiology, which in turn was based on international criteria
and procedures.
During the first three stages and the beginning of the fourth stage the method used
consisted of knowledge acquisition, i.e. making an inventory of the expert's
knowledge about the domain, the tasks and procedures. In the fourth stage one task
was analyzed in depth, implemented, and tested. Depending on the results of the test,
a next task was selected, or one or more of the preceding stages were revisited. For
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Figure 1. Top-down modular prototyping.
example, one conclusion of a module test may be that essential information was
missing, i.e. another task should have been performed first. After the test of a module
showed that it was successful, it is integrated into the system. If the partitioning at the
third stage was done accurately this would pose no problems. In the last stage the
whole system was tested, to see how the modules behave together.
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3.3 Knowledge Acquisition
A neuropsychiatrist of the Maastricht Academie Hospital was asked to cooperate in
the project, because he was specialized in the diagnosis of dementia. He was medical
coordinator of the Maastricht Memory Clinic (MMC), a department specialized in
early and differential diagnosis of dementia. Having a neuropsychiatrist cooperating
in the project had the advantage that both neurology and psychiatry, two essential
disciplines for the diagnosis of dementia, were covered. Another advantage for
knowledge acquisition was the availability of a standardized protocol consisting of a
documented checklist and the diagnostic criteria to be used. This protocol was based
on international guidelines for the diagnosis of dementia as detailed in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, DSM-III-R and the report of the NINCDS-ADRDA consensus
work group and proved very succesfull in discriminating non-dementing patients
from demented, even in the more early stages. 
18,19,20,21 
During knowledge
acquisition the role of the domain expert would be to explain the checklist and the
international guidelines used. This approach had the advantage that the knowledge
would be internationally acceptable, while avoiding the need to use more than one
domain expert.
To let the knowledge engineer familiarize himself with the subject, terminology,
procedures and the people involved, knowledge acquisition started from the moment
the project was initiated. To that end the knowledge engineer visited several
consultations and patient examinations. ** This included visiting several weekly
conferences about the patients involved. Each session attended was concluded by an
interview. Furthermore, the neuropsychiatrist and neuropsychologists involved
provided the necessary literature concerning the international criteria used. The fact
that the knowledge engineer was a cognitive psychologist was a clear advantage
during the whole project. After this initial period, the actual knowledge acquisition
started, proceeding in a top-down fashion, using the available checklist and the
international criteria as a guideline. As dementia diagnostics consisted of three tasks
(See paragraph 2 above), the first task, i.e., deciding on the syndrome dementia, would
be implemented first, followed by the tasks to find possible causes.
Although several knowledge acquisition methods exist22 , only a few were
considered appropriate in this domain: observation, (structured) interview and
document analysis. For several reasons (ethical, privacy), consultations and medical
examinations were observed and only discussed afterwards. The possibility to set up
simulation consultations was considered but rejected, because it would be very time
consuming while the information gain was questionable. Knowledge acquisition
proceeded top-down, i.e., from a general view of what dementia diagnostics means,
upto specific information on, for example, the effects of a deviating level of vitamin
B12 . Each interview session was tape-recorded and the typewritten version was given
to the domain expert for comment and error checking.
F.R.J. Verhey jr., M.D.
In each case the patient's consent was asked.
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3.4 The Expert System Development Tool (ESDT)
For the development of the ES the ESDT Acquaint was chosen. Acquaint is a Lisp
based hybrid system, using frames with a fixed format to represent conceptual and
procedural knowledge'. The central organizational property of Acquaint is the
rulebase. Rules are arranged in hierarchical contexts, controling subject related rules.
Each context is itself a rule, except that it has rules and subordinate contexts instead of
a THEN-part (For a more elaborate discussion see Plugge 23). In our development
method each context is a module, i.e., a domain expert's task or topic of investigation.
Acquaint offers much less facilities for the structuring of conceptual knowledge than
for the procedural knowledge. The main structuring facility is inheritance, which
organizes concepts hierarchically. In our system this feature was used only for
concepts carrying similar types of information, for example, laboratory blood test
results. The procedural knowledge, i.e. the rules and contexts, was used as the main
method for structuring, the organization of the conceptual knowledge was merely
used for the convenience of the knowledge engineer. Acquaint's explanation
mechanism provided the user with sufficient facilities to examine conceptual
information in coherence with each context, obliviating the necessity for a separate
structure for conceptual information. In our implementation the conceptual part of the
knowledge base was treated as a kind of blackboard, from which each context and/or
rule retrieved the necessary information and returned its findings.
Another feature of Acquaint is the use of MYCIN like certainty factors, which was
i mportant in our implementation to represent certainties about diagnoses. For
example, by consensus the clinical diagnosis DAT is made only with the labels
'possible' or 'probable'. Although the use of certainty factors is not the best method to
represent certainty, it is relatively easy to understand for the user in comparison with,
for example, the Bayesian method. 24 (For a more elaborated discussion of certainty
factors, see Chapter III paragraph 2.1 and 2.3)
In traditional Al terminology procedural knowledge refers to the procedural programming
laguage, while declarative knowledge refers to the rules and facts. However, the Function frame
in Acquaint encompasses both declarative and procedural knowledge. Therefore, in the
remainder of this thesis we will label knowledge consisting of rules as procedural knowledge and
knowledge about data -including the Function frame- as conceptual knowledge.
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4 THE ARCHITECTURE OF EVINCE
The architecture of Evince will be discussed from two perspectives: 1) the knowledge
representation design, and 2) the system design. This distinction is made, because the
knowledge of Evince was to be used in an interactive and a batch mode. In the former
mode the user would interactively go through a consultation session, while in the
laffer mode the system would examine one or more patient cases independently.
4.1 Conceptual and Procedural Knowledge representation
As mentioned before, the procedural knowledge was partitioned into different levels
(modules), coinciding with the examination tasks performed by the neuropsychiatrist.
These tasks and sub-tasks were represented in socalled contexts, while more detailed
knowledge was represented in rules within these contexts. This resulted in a
hierarchical tree, that is traced depth first by Acquaint's inference engine (see Figure 2,
page 41). Each context has the capability to decide whether or not it will be worth-
while to check its subordinate rules and contexts by testing its premises. If a context's
premises are not met, the tree will be pruned at that point, and another context at the
same level will be checked. However, in our implementation not all contexts use
selection criteria, because some tasks are performed routinely (e.g., the contexts
MEDICATION and LAB-TESTS), or because the use of selection criteria would be the
same as performing the task itself (e.g., the context ALCOHOL-ABUSE). An example
of three contexts using selection criteria is given in Table 1, page 42.
In Table 1, the context DEMENTIA is visited only when the Global Deterioration Scale
score is greater than 1 (a score of 1 means there is nothing wrong). If this is not true,
then the contexts DEPRESSION-DEMENTIA, M.I.D., ALZHEIMER, and Mix are not
visited. The contexts AMNESIA and MILD-COGNITIVE-DISORDER are at the same
level as the DEMENTIA context, but will only be visited if one or more diagnoses are
not true. Note, that the two bottom contexts will neither be visited when the inference
engine is unable to establish that the required diagnoses were true, i.e. when they are
known to be 'unknown'.
Although each context was developed relatively independent of each other there
was one exception: the Evaluation context. Because the Evaluation context is used to
process the findings (conclusions) from the previous contexts, it was developed in
parallel with all the other contexts. It is also the largest context without subcontexts,
because only the resulting diagnoses from the previous contexts are considered.
However, in a few rules more specific concepts are checked to produce more detailed
information. (See Table 2, page 43)
In contrast to contexts which are checked sequentially, rules are assigned a priority
by the inference engine's agenda. This scheduling is performed separately for each
context. The priority of a rule depends on the amount of information available, the
amount of certainty of competing conclusions, and the amount of information
required to prove a rule. For example, an OR-rule will receive a higher priority than
an AND-rule, because in an OR-rule only one true premise is required to make the
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EVINCE
REGISTRATION
CONSULTATION
PHYSIOLOGY
MEDICATION
LAB-TESTS
ALCOHOL-ABUSE
DISORDERS
SLEEP
DELIRIUM
MOOD
BEREAVEMENT
MAJOR-DEPRESSION
DYSTHYMIC-DISORDER
VASCULAR DISORDERS
DETERIORATION
DEMENTIA
DEPRESSION-DEMENTIA
M.I.D.
ALZHEIMER1 MIX
AMNESIA
MILD-COGN-DISORDER
EVALUATION
END
Fieure 2.
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Context DEMENTIA
IN: DETERIORATION
IF: GDS >1
Context DEPRESSION-DEMENTIA (IN: DEMENTIA)
Context M.I.D. (IN: DEMENTIA)
Context ALZHEIMER (IN: DEMENTIA)
Context MIX (IN: ALZHEIMER)
Context AMNESIA
IN: DETERIORATION
IF: $AND GDS > 1
$NOTTRUE (Diagnosis Demential Syndrome))
Context MILD-COGN-DISORDER
IN: DETERIORATION
IF: $AND GDS > 1
$NOTTRUE (Diagnosis Demential Syndrome)
$NOTTRUE (Diagnosis Amnestic Syndrome))
Note:
GDS = Global Deterioration Scale
M.I.D. = Multiple-infarct Dementia
MIX = Multiple-infarct Dementia with Alzheimer's Disease.
Table 1 Example of Context Level Knowledge.
rule succeed, while in an AND-rule all premises must be true. Because it takes less
effort to prove an OR-rule, it is given a higher priority.
Furthermore, rules can be treated as data by using them as an additional premise in
another rule. For example, the two main rules used for the diagnosis dementia (See
Table 3, page 44) are actually one rule with a nested OR (This is why the rule
R-B-Criterium does not need a THEN-part).
When an OR-rule checks its premises until one is found to be true, this could mean
that not all premises will be examined. The inference engine can be forced to evaluate
all premises by using the OR* prefix. Like an ordinary OR-rule, one true premise is
required for the rule to succeed. However, the evidence from the other premises is
used to possibly increase the certainty of the conclusion. Apart from the reason to
increase the certainty of conclusions, this strategy was also used to make sure that
related information was asked from the user within the same context. Thus, erratic
questioning behaviour by the system can be avoided.
Although Acquaint's frame based representation of conceptual knowledge is
restricted to the predefined slots, there was sufficient flexibility to store very different
types of information. This was an important property, because the diagnosis of
dementia requires the system to consider a variety of data. For example, the concept
EEG stores high level qualitative information, while the concept ComputeHamilton is
actually a hidden rule calling the function'+' to evaluate several other concepts. (See
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(DefRule R-Delirium-III
IF: $FORWARD
(Diagnosis Delirium)
THEN:
MSC-INFO (According to the DSM-III-R criteria (See pp. 100-103) $FullName
bas a delirium. \(p= ^A$R-Delirium-III ^A\) However, in order to examine
the possibility of a demential syndrome, a delirium must be precluded))
(DefRule R-DeliriumAlcohol
IF: $FORWARD
$AND* (Diagnosis Delirium)
(Diagnosis Alcohol Abuse)
THEN:
MSG-INFO (The delirium could be caused by excessive use of alcohol.
\(p= ^A$R-DeliriumAlcohol ^A\) ))
(DefRule R-DeliriumMedicine
IF: $FORWARD
$AND* (Diagnosis Delirium)
DrugDisorder = '("confusional states")
THEN:
MSG-INFO (The delirium could be medication induced.
\(p= ^A$R-DeliriumMedicine ^A\))
MSG-INFO (Confusional states can be induced by the following drugs\:
PrintKeyList(MedicationClasses "confusional states")))
Note:
DefRule: define Tule
$FORWARD: use this Tule only in forward mode, i.e., do not ask questions if the value
of the concept is unknown.
MSG-INFO: to send a message to the screen.
PrintKeyList: A functions that prints items that are associated with a certain key.
p=<rulename>: Print a certainty factor.
$FullName: Prints the patient's name.
bie 2 Examnle of Rules from the Evaluation Context.
Table 4, page 45) On the other hand, the concept Diagnosis is a collection of diagnostic
instances gathered during the consultation process, each carrying the certainty with
which it was asserted or rejected.
Although not directly transparent to the user, the concept class diagnosis is used to
make a distinction between diagnostic conclusions and information requested from
the user. By storing all the conclusions as instances of the concept Diagnosis the rules
in the Evaluation context simply had to check these instances and their relevant
combinations.
Development of Evince
(DefRule R-B-Criterium
IF: $OR* AbstractThinking
JudgementDisorder
CharacterChange
HighCorticalFunct = 'afasia
HighCorticalFunct = 'agnosia
HighCorticalFunct = 'apraxia
HighCorticalFunct = '1 constructive apraxia 1)
(DefRule R-Dementia
IF: $AND PastMemory >= 3
RecentMemory >= 3
ShortTermMemory >= 3
R-B-Criterium
Functioning > 3
THEN: -90 (Diagnosis Mild Cognitive Disorder)
-90 (Diagnosis Amnestie Syndrome)
90 (Diagnosis Demential Syndrome)
ELSE: -90 (Diagnosis Demential Syndrome)
-90 (Diagnosis Medication Induced Dementia)
-90 (Diagnosis Epileptic Induced Dementia)
-70 (Diagnosis Depression Induced Dementia)
-90 (Diagnosis Multi Infarct Dementia)
-90 (Diagnosis Dementia Alzheimer Type)
-90 (Diagnosis MIX))
Note:
Rules are predeeded by R-, e.g. R-Dementia.
The figures preceeding the conclusions are the maximum or minimum certainty with
which a conclusion is asserted.
Table 3. Rules for the Diagnosis Dementia.
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(DefConcept EEG
FACT: Electro Encephalogram
PROMPT: EEG findings
COMMENT: Choose'unknown' if your finding is not listed below.
EXPECT: VALUES none unknown diffuse_lowered focal_pathology
increased_Beta-activity epileptic_activity
DEFAULT: none
CLASS: LOG (an artificial class for filing purposes)
PROP: ASK)
(DefConcept ComputeHamilton
FACT: Score of the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale
IF: Sex = 'male
DO: Mood + Guilt + Suicide + SleepStartDisorder + SleepThruDisorder +
SleepEndDisorder + Activities + Restraining + Agitation + PsychologicalFears
+ PhysicalFears + GastrolntestSympt + GenPhysicalSympt + Hypochondria +
BodyWeight + Disorderinsight + LossOfLibido
IF: Sex = 'female
DO: Mood + Guilt + Suicide + SleepStartDisorder + SleepThruDisorder +
SleepEndDisorder + Activities + Restraining + Agitation + PsychologicalFears
+ PhysicalFears + GastrolntestSympt + GenPhysicalSympt + Hypochondria +
BodyWeight + DisorderInsight + FemGenitalDisorder
PROP: ASKNOT)
(DefConcept Diagnosis
EXPECT: GROUP
CLASS: LOG
PROP: ASKNOT)
% Example Instances %
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Amnestic Syndrome))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Delirium))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Mild Cognitive Disorder))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Depression Induced Dementia))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Dysthymic Disorder))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Major Depressive Episode))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis MIX))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Multi Infarct Dementia))
(DefConcept (Diagnosis Complicated Bereavement))
Note:
FACT = The print name of the concept; PROMPT = The question to be asked;
COMMENT = Explanation; EXPECT = Values to expect; CLASS = The concept's
class PROP: = Properties, e.g., ASK, ASKNOT; DO = equivalent to THEN.
Table 4
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4.2 System Design
Although an interactive consultation is efficient, because not all tasks have to be
completed given sufficient evidence, it is clearly less efficient when the data of several
patients have to be entered. Therefor the system was expanded to provide a way to
consult the system in batch mode. Even at this level of system design the modular
approach proved itself very useful. As the ESDT Acquaint can address only 640 kByte
of memory, the system designed so far had to be split in several modules to be loaded
when necessary (See Appendix I). The present system's design is shown in Figure 3.
The Manager Module offers the user a choice between Batch Mode and Interactive
Consultation. If Batch Mode is chosen, the user must choose one or more patient data
files to be processed by the Consultation Module. For both consultation modes the
same modules are used, i.e., the Consultation Module and the Report Module, which
contain the actual knowledge base. The respective modules are sent a message
whether they should work in Batch Mode or in Interactive Mode. In Batch Mode the
number of files to process determines how many times a consultation is repeated. In
both modes, the report is stored on file, and can be viewed or printed from the
Manager Module.
Although the use of the Batch Mode Consultation decreases the consultation time, it
has the disadvantage that the system cannot be asked any questions. Furthermore,
there is a certain risk that the system will not arrive at a (correct) diagnosis due to
missing data, because it is not allowed to ask questions during Batch Mode. Presently
the data of the patients are stored in separate files, but a database is being designed.
Because the knowledge of Evince is dispersed over several modules, it is difficult to
say'how much' knowledge Evince actually contains. Furthermore, the complete
knowledge is separated in 4 different types, of which the rules and concepts are the
central part. Table 5 lists the amount of knowledge type per module.
Table 5. Number of Knowledge Frames
Manager Database Consult Report
Forms 3 14 6 1
Contexts 5 4 25 3
Rules 19 14 73 36
Concepts 10 126 129 32
Formulas 15 1 3 99 6
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Figure 3. Evince Module System Design.
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the course of development two experiments were set up to test Evince. The
result of these tests showed that the knowledge base could compete with top experts
in its field and produce better results than the average clinician. 7•8 Moreover, the
results showed that Evince provides a valuable tool for an interdisciplinary approach
in dementia diagnostics. Thus the risk of discipline biased diagnoses, as found in one
of our experiments, can be avoided.8
Also, the top-down development method and the modular design have proven to be
very useful. A top-down development approach guarantees that the knowledge
documentation and structuring is done prior to the implementation, because it
requires that a complete model is used. However, it does not require that knowledge
acquisition is detailed on all levels prior to the implementation, as is required by the
KADS method. 14 This top-down approach is further supported by the modular design,
which makes it possible to implement parts at different levels of detail, that can be
enhanced at later stages. Furthermore, a modular system can be expanded without
changing the structure, by simply adding other modules. For example, with the
modular approach a therapeutic module can be added to the system and even have an
architecture that is very different from Evince.
The implementation of international guidelines for dementia diagnostics makes it
unlikely that the design of the present diagnostic system will have to be changed
radically within the near future. This is a clear advantage of using the domain expert
as a mediator for the available consensus knowledge, and not as the main source of
knowledge. Nevertheless, it remains likely that the present system will be subject to
some small changes over time, due to new methods, the introduction of new findings
and new criteria. It is at that point that the modularity of the system will prove itself a
valuable approach for system maintenance.
With reference to the remarks made in the introduction about causes hindering ESs
research to reach an operational stage, it seems legitimate to state that the method
used to develop Evince has made it possible to avoid these pitfalls. Also, it should be
stressed that reports on this development have been quite different from what is (still)
common practice in ES research. Many studies present only some percentages about
correct or incorrect diagnoses (c.f. Rienhoff et al. 25). In contrast, the reports about
Evince emphasized a careful description of the evaluation methods and results,
reporting about the patients used, the experts, the data, and methods of analysis. As
ESs are primarily meant for practical use, we think that it should become common
practice that ES research reports pay more attention to the topics just mentioned. In
our opinion this will not only enhance the development of new techniques, but also
have a positive spin-off for the domain of interest.
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V A DESKTOP EXPERT SYSTEM
FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF DEMENTIA.
1 INTRODUCTION
An expert system (ES) is a computer program designed for specific fields of expertise
in which it attains a performance equal or better than that of a human expert. More
specifically, medical ESs can be regarded as computer software products with a
medical data base that are designed to assist physicians and medical personnel in
diagnosis, therapy, and related tasks in medical care.' As the use of medical ESs is
expected to produce profound changes in health care, it is deemed of utmost
importance to know the potential of this new technology.'' 2 '3 For instance, it is of
relevance to know whether medical ESs are able to make similar - or even better -
diagnoses than a physician, and whether medical ESs could be of value in improving
health care. In addition, it is important to acquire information about the possible
benefits and risks of this new technology 4
The medical ESs that have been developed up till now, share some characteristics.
Firstly, they have been developed for areas in which the expert knowledge is fairly
well defined, such as CENTAUR (interpretation of pulmonary tests) and AI/MM
(renal physiology). 5 Secondly, a common feature of most medical ESs is that the
amount of data used is relatively small. Thirdly, hardly any medical ES developed so
far has left the prototypical or demonstration stage and there is a paucity of studies in
which the medical ES is compared with the physician, i.e. 'domain expert'. Fourthly,
there is a very rapid increase in the use of personal computers in medicine, but until
now no reports have been published about their potential use for medical ESs. Thus it
is of interest to know whether it is possible to develop a medical ES for more complex
problems such as those in areas where physiological, behavioral and psychosocial data
have to be combined, whether such an medical ES can be developed on a - cheap -
personal computer and whether such a medical ES yields conclusions that are similar
to those of the physician/domain expert. The present paper applies these questions to
the field of neuropsychiatry and the increasingly important topic of the differential
diagnosis of dementia.
In the first part of this paper a description will be given of the development of
EVINCE-I. The second part presents the assessment of the medical ES EVINCE-I
versus the domain expert in diagnosing 29 patients.
This chapter was published as: Plugge LA, Verhey FRJ, Dolles J. A desktop expert system for the
differential diagnosis of dementia: an evaluation study. Int J. Techn Assessment in Health Care,
1990, 6; 1: 147-156.
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2 DEVELOPMENT OF EVINCE
2.1 Differential Diagnosis of Demential Syndromes
Dementia is a concept that still has very controversial definitions, although most
experts agree that it is better regarded as a syndrome than as a nosological entity.
Some essential features of the demential syndrome are: memory impairment,
intellectual deterioration and changes in personality.' Dementia can have many
different causes: up to 50 different causes are enumerated by Marsden'. The two main
causes of dementia are Dementia of Alzheimer Type (DAT), with a prevalence of 39-
50% of the total number of cases, and multi-infarct dementia (MID), with a prevalence
ranging from 13-30%. This leaves approximately 20 -48% accounted for by the
remaining causes.'' 8 '9 These broad ranges can be explained by the difficulty in
defining the concepts DAT and MID. Some researchers regard the overlap between
DAT and MID as a special category, usually referred to as Mix. Moreover, some
include depression-induced dementia, i.e. pseudodementia 9, which has a prevalence
of approximately 9%, whereas others exclude this condition from their figures.
Given the succinct description presented above, the task of the ES in making a
diagnosis in the individual patient is threefold:
1. deciding on the diagnosis'dementia',
2. searching for neurologica) signs and other somatic indices,
3. interpreting these signs to decide on the aetiology of dementia.
This means that the ES should have knowledge of common disorders that present
themselves as dementia, e.g. depression, and disorders that preclude the diagnosis of
dementia, e.g. delirium. After stating the diagnosis as being dementia, the ES should
be able to differentiate between the possible causes of dementia. Since dementia is
caused in 52-80% of all cases by DAT and MID, and because depression is a major
disorder that can present itself as dementia, it was decided to centre the domain
around these three causes. The possibility of adding some or all of the other causes in
a later version of the ES was left open; their choice would depend on the data used for
diagnosing the three main causes. This decision was made to economize on the
amount of data needed in the present version of the ES.
Beside making valid diagnoses, i.e. a significant agreement between the ES and the
domain expert, it was deemed important that both the ES and the domain expert
express their certainty about any diagnosis made. Such a requirement would enable us
to make a more precise comparison between the ES and the domain expert.
Furthermore the ES should be able to reproduce the process of medical decision
making (MDM) which takes place in the domain expert, for later evaluation of the
rules and data used. This would simplify comparison of the differences and similari-
ties found.
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2.2 The Choice of the Expert System Shell
The most common structure for ESs is a computer program consisting of a knowledge
base, an inference engine to infer new facts with the help of the rule base and data
available and a user interface to regulate the communication between the user and the
inference engine.'o
ES-shells consist of the above-mentioned units, excluding the knowledge base, and
one of the major decisions to be made in the development of an ES is the choice of the
appropriate ES-shell. This is because the shell determines the type of knowledge
representation and the inferences possible. For the development of EVINCE-I the
expert system tool ACQUAINT was chosen. 11 '12
 Knowledge in ACQUAINT is
represented in frames, comparable to a database structure, which makes it relatively
easy to add or delete knowledge. Reasoning in ACQUAINT can be both hypothesis
and data directed, i.e. forward and backward, and includes the use of certainty
factors" as a measure of confidence. Rules can be used at different levels of reasoning,
i.e. rules controlling rules, and are organized in easy readable IF-THEN statements.
Further more, ACQUAINT is operational on the widespread standard IBM-compatible
PC with 512 K-RAM and two floppy drives. Another important feature is that the end-
user is supplied with a run-time copy of the ES and not the whole tool, which makes it
financially very attractive.
2.3 Defining the Knowledge Base
After the initial preparations of forming a general picture of the domain, a start was
made by further defining the problem. This was done by drawing a detailed picture of
the MDM strategy used by the domain expert, a neuropsychiatrist who is a member of
the department of Neuropsychology and Psychobiology at the University of Limburg.
This expert was chosen, because of the method he used, which is based on internatio-
nal guidelines for the diagnosis of dementia as detailed in DSM-III-R 13 and the report
of the NINCDS-ADRDA consensus work group". Thus the knowledge to be imple-
mented would be widely acceptable. The domain expert was therefore interviewed
about these guidelines, and the protocols resulting from them were examined. This
resulted in a decision tree which reflects the search strategy used by the domain
expert. The decision tree is organized into contexts which each control a body of rules
and data concerning the subject to be investigated. The data used by EVINCE-I can be
found in Table 1 (see the next page) and the diagnosis in Table 2. The global decision
procedure will be discussed in the next chapter.
For a more detailed description of the use and calculation of certainty factors the reader is
referred to references 5, 11 and chapter III, paragraph 2.1.
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Subject: Contents:
Identification data: age, name, I.D.-number, date of birth, consultation date, sex,
hand preference, occupation, social-economic status,
educational level.
Haematology: BSE, Hb, Ht-percentage, Leucocyte
Chemistry: Kalium, Na, Ca, P, Glucose, B 1, B12, AF, Gamma-GT, OT, PT,
T4, TSH.
AuxiWary tests: EEG, CT-scan, ECG.
Anamnesis: weight, alcohol use (former and present), appetite, smoking
habit (former and present), intoxication, occupational
functioning, social functioning.
Cognitive functions: memory, abstract thinking, higher cortical functions
(aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, constructive apraxia), consious-
ness, attention, judgement, orientation, perception.
Motor functions: speech, motorial activity.
Personality: character, personality, social activities, disorder-insight.
Complaint patterns: onset, deterioration course, deterioration pace, physical
complaints.
Sleep: somnolence, sleep-start disorder, sleep-through disorder,
sleep-end disorder, nocturnal confusion.
Mood: lability, mood fluctuations, daytime fluctuations, guilt
feelings, suicidal thoughts, inhibitions, agitation, fears with
psychological or somatic manifestations (general and gastro-
intestinal), libido, hypochondria, depersonalization and
depersonalization type, paranoiac symptoms, symptoms of
compulsion, Hamilton depression score.
Atherosclerosis: anamnestic hypertension, TJA, CVA, atherosclerosis, focal
neurological symptoms, focal neurological signs, Hachinski
score's
Note: The list above represents the data gathered during medical examination, not the
variables and functions used for window management, file variables, etc.
Table 1. Patient characteristics used by EVINCE-I
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* Demential syndrome (senile/pre-senile).
* Primary degenerative dementia (senile/pre-senile).
* Multiple infarct dementia.
* Major Depression.
* Delirium.
* Cognitive Disorders.
* Hyperthyreosis and Hypothyreosis
* Diabetes.
* Alcoholism.
* Electrolyte disorder.
* Inflammation.
* Vitamin-B-insufficiency.
* Medication.
* Epilepsy.
Table 2. Diagnostic knowledge used by EVINCE-I
2.4 Description of the Decision Procedures.
The root node, or top-level context, is called'Initiate' and contains an introduction to
the system. The next context contains a few rules to decide whether the problem of
investigation is part of the knowledge domain. If it fits the domain, or if the user is not
sure, the actual consultation will begin. The actual consultation begins by collecting
general data about the patient, such as date of birth, age, sex, et cetera, in the context
'Patient Data', and data from auxiliary investigations, such as blood and urine tests, in
the context 'Preliminary Data'. In this latter context EVINCE-I will check the data for
possible deviations which could yield any preliminary diagnosis. These findings are
then used during the examinations to follow. After that EVJ NCE-I will try to find out
the patient's state of consciousness. If the system is sure that the patient's conscious-
ness is clouded, i.e. one or more symptoms fit the criteria for delirium, it will
terminate the consultation. The system will then leap to the'Report' context and make
a final report. The decision to abstain from further examination is taken on the basis
that the consciousness should not be douded, which is one of the DSM-III-R criteria
for dementia13
If the patient's consciousness is not clouded, EVINCE's will try to determine
whether this particular case is an instance of dementia without making a decision
about the etiology. EVINCE-I does so by using the remaining DSM-III-R 73 criteria for
dementia. If dementia is not diagnosed, EVINCE-I will skip any context concerning
dementia and jump to the context which determines whether depression is the cause
of any of the problems encountered. In the'Report' context it collects the diagnoses
made thus far, checks them for mutual implications, and presents its findings.
If dementia is diagnosed, the system will try to determine the cause of the demential
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Fieure 1. Context-level decision tree.
syndrome. This is done in a special way, related to the nature of the main cause: DAT.
Since DAT is initially diagnosed by using exclusion criteria the diagnosis DAT is
delayed until all other causes have been excluded. Therefore EVINCE-I will first check
the data for any vascular problems that could lead to the diagnosis of MID, the next
major cause of dementia. Independent of the outcome EVINCE-I will check the data
for signs of depression. Finally a last check is performed in the 'Report' context to see
if any of the preceding diagnoses can be used to exclude the diagnosis DAT, e.g. a
vitamin B12 deficiency.
When all these steps have been taken, and DAT can still not be excluded, the ES will
use some of the preliminary data to adjust the certainty factor of the final diagnosis
DAT. The certainty factor is raised, for example, when the EEG pattern shows
deceleration in the alpha-rhythm activity. The certainty factor is decreased if the EEG
shows any signs of focal pathology. However, none of these data can exclude or
confirm DAT by itself, they are used as the NINCDS-ADRDA work group" propose:
for adjustment of the diagnostic confidence.
The final report that EVINCE-I produces is made in the 'Report' context. This
context reflects the evaluative activity of the domain expert and the reformulation of
the findings in legible standard phrases. This context, or child context, will write
complete standard reports in future versions.
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3 A COMPARISON BETWEEN EVINCE AND THE DOMAIN EXPERT
3.1 Introduction
As stated above, it was deemed important to know whether a desk-top ES is powerful
enough to make valid diagnoses. The performance of EVINCE-I was therefore
compared to that of the domain expert in an experiment in which the following two
hypotheses were tested:
1. expert and EVINCE-I agree on their diagnoses,
2. expert and EVINCE-I agree on the relative certainties of these diagnoses.
Furthermore the number of false positive and false negative diagnoses made by
EVINCE-I was compared to that of the expert, in order to see whether a specific type
of mistake prevailed in any diagnostic category.
3.2 Methods
From the patient records available from the Maastricht Memory Clinic, 19 patients
were drawn who had been diagnosed with at least 50% certainty as having dementia,
according to the estimation of the domain expert, irrespective of its cause or other
diagnoses. These cases were taken to see whether EVINCE-I would make any false-
negative dementia diagnoses. To check if EVINCE-I would make any false-positive
dementia diagnosis, 10 other patients were drawn who were not diagnosed as having
dementia. Most of these patients suffered clinically from a (mild) depression. The
mean age of the first group was 73 (sd = 7.5) and that of the second group was 47 (sd
=14.6). None of the applied diagnostic criteria uses age as a distinguishing factor, they
are reported here for the sake of completeness. All patients had been diagnosed by one
domain expert and none of the cases had been used in test runs when the system was
being developed.
The expert received a form with a short instruction which asked him to write down
the diagnoses of each patient in key words with a certainty value. This value could
vary between 0 (unknown) to 100 (absolutely certain). This certainty scale was used
because EVINCE-I gave certainties within the same range. The data of the 29 patients
given to EVINCE-I were entered by the knowledge engineer. All data requested by
EVINCE-I were present in the patient records.
3.3 Results
The main diagnoses were: dementia (DEM), dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT),
multiple infarct dementia (MID), depression (DEP) and a residual category (RES).
Since the RES category contained too great a variety of diagnoses for a meaningful
comparison, this category was dropped from the statistical analysis. Each patient
received one or more of the diagnoses mentioned above. The categories of possible
diagnosis made by the human expert and the system can be found in Table 3. First it
was examined to what extent EVINCE-I and the domain expert were in agreement for
all combinations of diagnosis made (the categories 1 through 8 in table 3), by calcula-
ting the kappa16. The results can be seen in Table 4, test 1.
Evince vs Domain Expert58
Diagnosis
Gat
 DEM DAT MID DEP
Test
1 x x -
2 x x - x
3 x - x -
4 x - x x
5 x - - -
6 x - x
7 - -
8 - - - x
Note: DEM=dementia; DAT=Dementia of Alzhei-
mer's Type; MID=multi-infarct dementia;
DEP=depression; x=present; -=absent
Table 3. Diagnostic categories.
Test Categories Obs. Exp. Kappa Z-score
1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 0.69 0.18 0.62 7.19
2 (1+2),(3+4),(5+6),(7+8) 0.90 0.29 0.85 7.13
3 (1+2+3+4+5+6),(7+8) 1.00 0.55 1.00 4.89
4 (1+2),(3+4+5+6),(7+8) 0.93 0.33 0.90 6.82
5 (1+2+5+6),(3+4),(7+8) 0.93 0.34 0.90 6.78
All Z-scores are significant: p < 0.0001
See Table 3 for the meaning of the categories.
Note: Obs. is the observed agreement and Exp. is the agreement expected
by chance.
Table 4. interrater agreement per diagnostic category
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The overall level of agreement between the two raters was moderate. The reason that
the overall agreement was not high can be found in the categories (7+8) and (3+4),
which were supposed to make a distinction between patients diagnosed as depressed
or not (See Table 3), but failed to do so adequately. The amount of agreement between
the raters increased when the diagnosis DEP was not taken into consideration, as can
be seen in test 2 of Table 4.
In test 3, we analyzed the agreement between the two raters on the diagnosis DEM,
i.e. categories (1 +2+3+4+5+6) and (7+8). This is an important diagnosis to test for,
since the diagnosis DAT and MID are dependent on it. Table 4, test 3, shows that both
raters showed a perfect agreement on this diagnosis. Since MID and DAT are
considered to be mutually exclusive diagnoses in this system, we tested the agreement
for the diagnosis DEM with DAT, i.e. categories (1+2), (3+4+5+6) and (7+8), and DEM
with MID, i.e. categories (1+2+5+6), (3+4) and (7+8), separately. In both cases, the
raters showed a high degree of agreement on their diagnoses. (See Table 4, tests 4 and
5)
The results indicate that the agreement between EVINCE-I and the domain expert is
"high" to "perfect" when corrected for the diagnosis DEP. Clearly depression is the
only diagnosis that is not handled correctly by EVINCE-I.
After this analysis the ratings, i.e., the certainties about a the diagnoses, were
transformed, with normal rounding, to an 11 point (0-10) scale in order to test whether
the certainties of EVINCE-I and domain expert agree in direction and relative
magnitude. We used the same diagnosis as above, but examined them separately since
we were only interested in the individual certainties of the diagnoses. For each
diagnosis we computed the Spearman rank correlation coefficient.
Category Spearman's con: DF: t Prob:
DEM 0.916 27 11.86 p < 0.001
DAT 0.821 27 7.47 p <0.001
MID 0.849 27 8.35 p <0.001
DEP 0.560 27 3.51 p <0.002
N = 29 two sided
Table 5. Interrater agreement usine a 11-point certain-
ty scale.
Table 5 shows that the raters displayed a high degree of correlation in their certainty
about the diagnostic subjects, except for the diagnosis DEP, which showed a moderate
correlation.
Although the RES category was dropped from the statistical analysis, we can still find
some clues to the ability of EVINCE-I to diagnose rarer causes of dementia. For
example, one patient was diagnosed by EVINCE-I as suffering from MID, but had in
60 Evince vs Domain Expert
fact Multiple Scierosis. Since the system knew nothing about MS, MID is a logical near
miss. Another patient's diagnosis contained the comment "cave vitamin B,Z deficiency"
from the domain expert. EVINCE-I picked this possible cause up and made the same
note in its report.
In two cases, the psychiatrist noted a deviation in the function of the thyroid gland,
and EVINCE-I managed to note one of these two cases. Alcohol as a probable cause
for dementia was noted in two cases by both the expert and EVINCE-I.
3.4 Discussion
Given the results presented the tests confirm our notion that EVINCE-I can be
considered a reasonably good replication of human expertise on the subject matter.
The results further show that an ES makes it easier to trace problems in the domain
knowledge. Furthermore, the fact that EVINCE-I uses not more than 122 concepts*,
which is substantially less than the total data gathered by the human expert, and still
is able to produce these results, shows that an ES can be used as a means to assess the
contribution of the data used by the expert. Further development of EVINCE-I and a
test of these possibilities is currently being performed.
The fact that the correlation between the domain expert and EVINCE-I was high for
the categories DEM, DAT and MID, provides evidence that the knowledge
represented in EVINCE-I is sufficiently sophisticated to yield valid diagnoses within
these three categories. EVINCE-I also seemed to do a good job for the more rarely
occurring causes of dementia, when it had the knowledge to detect them. One case
with a deviating thyroid gland functioning was missed by EVINCE-I because only the
value of the TSH hormone deviated (0.6 mU/1) and not the T4 hormone (11.6 pmol/1),
while the rules which assess the functioning of the thyroid glad require a deviation of
both hormone levels."
The only category EVINCE-I performed less well on, is that of depression. In
examining the reasons for the discrepancy between EVINCE-I and the domain expert,
two possible causes are relevant:
1. EVINCE-I might be relying too heavily on the interpretation of the Hamilton
Depression Rating Scale (HDRS)". In an evaluative discussion the domain expert
stated that the HDRS-score is used as a measure of severity and not as a diagnostic
criterium.
2. Another cause for the low correlation may be due to a rule in EVINCE-I that
decides whether or not to investigate depression. It does so only if a patient
appears to be, or feel, depressed. This might be the pitfall for patients who do not
The term 'concept' refers to any object that is not a Tule, context, form or formula. For example,
the concept 'HELP' bas no relation to the patient data, but to the user of the program. It is
however included in the concept count like many other of such control concepts. As the second
version of Evince was devided over 4 modules, the number of concepts is different from the
first version which consisted of one large program.
According to the patient's records a treatment for the thyroid disfunction was administered and
three years later both hormone levels were witpin the normal range.
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show obvious signs of depression.
These causes explain why EVINCE-I made 4 false negative and 2 false positive
diagnoses in this category. The first cause indicates that the system does not have
sufficient criteria, while the second cause indicates that the system rejects investigating
the possibility of depression too often. However, there is yet a further possibility,
which is typical for the problems in this domain. Since a psychiatric diagnosis
(especially depression) can hardly ever be determined with absolute certainty, it could
be that the domain expert, and not EVINCE-I, made the wrong diagnoses. An
experiment involving several human experts and an improved version of EVINCE-I
has been performed to examine this possibility. The data of that experiment are being
analyzed now.
Furthermore the domain currently covered by EVINCE-I is expanded to include
amnestic and dysthymic disorders. A future version of EVINCE-I will also have to be
expanded to incorparate more of the over 50 possible causes of dementia than those
presently available (See Table 2). This could lead to a system that provides a standard
protocol for dinicians and for researchers who need to select patients with dementia.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As stated in the introduction, the EVINCE-I project set out to assess the possibility
of developing an ES for the differential diagnosis of demential syndromes. We further
wanted to assess the possibility of whether such an ES could be implemented on a
personal computer and whether it would yield conclusions that are similar to those of
the physician. The results of the assessment presented above strongly confirm our
belief that the use of such an ES is feasible and offers promising leads for use in future
assessments. An ES on the subject of demential syndromes could - for example - be a
tremendous help in [1] mobilizing expert knowledge and make this knowledge acces-
sible, [2] assessing the contribution of data to the reliability of the diagnosis, [3]
examining the efficiency of the organization, procedures and decisions in gathering
data (i.e. time required, costs involved, inconvenience for the patient, et cetera) [4]
investigating the effect of missing data when re-diagnosing patients.
An ES used as a model system could thus offer not only the opportunity to assist in
making reliable diagnoses, but also provide a new technique to assess a broad range of
subjects in the domain of expertise. At the moment an adapted and expanded version
of the ES, EVINCE-Il, is being used to assess the topics mentioned above.
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VI DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF DEMENTIA:
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY INTO
INTRA- AND INTER-DISCIPLINE AGREEMENT.
1 INTRODUCTION.
During the past decades, the number of old people in western countries has increased
both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the total population of these
countries. Increasingly, interest has been focussed on diseases associated with aging.
Dementing conditions are prominent in this respect: recent epidemiological studies
indicate that at least 5% of all subjects aged 65 or older suffer from a moderate or
severe dementia, and between 2.6% and 52.7% for mild dementia, while the
percentage with moderate or severe dementia increases to 20% for subjects over 85
years of age.'2 ,3'4'5
The need for accurate diagnosis and classification has led to the organization of
consensus meetings in different countries .6 Criteria have been formulated based on
the discussions of these consensus meetings. For instance, the criteria published by
McKhann et al. 7 after the 1984 meeting organized by the NINCDS-ADRDA are still a
cornerstone in the classification of Alzheimer's disease, which accounts for 50 to 80%
of all cases of dementia. Unfortunately, no concrete information is available on the
actual level of consensus among clinicians involved in the differential diagnosis and
classification of dementia. In addition, quantitative information about the influence of
these consensus meetings on physician behavior in daily practice is lacking.
Furthermore, in the majority of health care institutions, the diagnosis and classification
of dementia is done by specialists of one discipline. Since dementia is a condition
which is characterized by neurological, psychiatric, psychosocial and somatic aspects,
the final diagnosis and classification could be biased by the nature of the medical
specialization of the physician. For this reason, it is recommended that a patient
thought to suffer from dementia should be examined by a multidisciplinary team of
specialists. 8 The purpose of the present study was to provide quantitative information
about these points.
The first aim of the study was to assess and compare the level of agreement within
several medical disciplines routinely involved in diagnosing dementia. The second
aim was to determine whether there were any differences in the use of diagnostic
classes between the disciplines. The hypothesis was that such differences exist because
of the specialized knowledge of each discipline, which causes specialists to be
especially sensitive to certain kinds of information and not for others. The third aim of
the study was to assess the influence of a consensus meeting on this level of
agreement. To this end, we examined the diagnoses made by clinicians on the basis of
ten standard cases.
This chapter was published as: Plugge LA, Verhey FRJ, Van Everdingen JJE, Jolles J. Differential
diagnosis of dementia: an experimental study into intra- and interdiscipline agreement. J.
Geriatrie Psychiatry and Neurology, 1991, 4; 2: 90-97.
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2 METHODS
2.1
 Subjects
In close cooperation with the Dutch National Organization for Quality Assurance in
Hospitals (CBO), an inquiry was organized to gather information on the effect of a
consensus meeting on the differential diagnosis of dementia. The aim of the CBO
concensus meetings is to improve the quality of differential diagnosis and
classification by the formulation of practical guidelines through joint discussion
between clinicians from several disciplines . 9 Interest in the subject was so great that
not all applicants could altend the meeting. Four hundred and fifty-eight people were
registered, representing six disciplines, i.e., neurologists, psychiatrists, general
physicians, nursing home physicians, psychologists, and a residual group from other
disciplines, such as research and hospital management.
A number of participants considered themselves too inexperienced with the subject
and returned the questionnaire; 127 participants completed the preconsensus meeting
questionnaire. Of these respondents, 90 completed the postconsensus questionnaire.
The data of these 90 respondents was analyzed (Table 1).
Discipline Participants n (%) Respondents n (%)
neurologists 100 (22) 24 (27)
psychiatrists 57 (13) 13 (14)
general physicians 74 (16) 12 (13)
nursing home physicians 133 (29) 26 (29)
psychologists 66 (14) 10 (11)
Other 28 (6) 5 (6)
Total 458 (100) 90 (100)
Table 1. Number of Participants and Respondents in Absolute
Figures and as a Percentage of Total.
2.2 Materials
Two sets of five case reports, each selected from the records of the Maastricht Memory
Clinic, were prepared such that the two sets of five patient case descriptions were
comparable in the severity and complexity of the memory disorder. The sequence of
the cases in each set was randomized in order to avoid possible order effects (Table 2).
Each case description was presented as a standard letter and contained all
information necessary to make a diagnosis in accordance with standard research
criteria recommended by the DSM-III-R and the NINCDS-ADRDA work group.'''o
The information was incorporated in the following paragraphs: introduction, medical
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Survey Case Sex Age Diagnosis
1 1 F 74 Moderate dementia, probable DAT, with depressive
symptoms
2 F 80 Moderate dementia, probable DAT; neuroleptic-induced
parkinsonism
3 M 78 Severe dementia, MID; neuroleptic-induced parkinsonism
4 F 66 Mild dementia, possible DAT or depression-induced
dementia
5 F 71 Slight cognitive deficit (no dementia), history of CVA,
adjustment disorder with depressive symptoms
2 6 M 62 Slight cognitive deficit (no dementia), history of TIA or
mood disorder
7 F 80 Severe dementia, probable DAT
8 F 86 Mild dementia with depression, MID
9 M 72 Mild dementia, possible DAT, MID, depression.
10 M 67 Moderate dementia, MID
Note: DAT=Dementia of Alzheimer's type; CVA=cerebrovascular accident; MID=Multi
infarct dementia; TIA=transient ischemic attack.
of Diagnoses, Based on the Diagnostic Report With
Neurological, Psychiatric and Neuropsychological Information From a
Multidisciplinary Expert Committee.
history, history as reported by the patient, history as reported by a partner or close
member of the family, psychiatric and neurological history, medical history,
medication data, intoxication data, psychosocial data, daily functioning, physical
examination, neurological examination, psychiatric examination, blood examination,
neuropsychological examination, additional examination (i.e. computed tomographic
scan, chest radiograph, electroencephalogram, electrocardiogram)." Two inquiry
booklets were assembled containing: an instruction page, a questionnaire, and one set
of five case descriptions. Booklet 1 contained the cases 1 through 5 and booklet 2 the
cases 6 through 10.
To guarantee the patient's privacy, any information that might identify the patient was either
changed or omitted.
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2.3 Inquiry Procedure
One week before the consensus meeting, each of the 458 registered participants was
sent a copy of booklet 1 with an introductory letter informing the participant that the
questionnaire was concerned with the current status of the clinical diagnosis of
dementia. No indication was given that a second questionnaire would be presented
after the consensus meeting. To guarantee the privacy of the participants the
questionnaires were labeled with numbers assigned by the CBO administration office.
In the instruction to booklet 1 each participant was asked to answer questions
concerning his or her age, years of medical experience, discipline, job location, hours
per week spent on the differential diagnosis and classification of patients with
dementia, and whether or not she or he had read the consensus meeting handbook.
Finally, after examining the case descriptions, they were asked to write down their
diagnoses. In both the intruction form and questionnaire it was indicated that making
more than one diagnosis was allowed, by using the Dutch plural/singular style
"diagnose(n)". The phrases'etiologic' and 'syndrome' were not used, to avoid making
a direct reference to the consensus meeting and thereby possibly influencing
diagnostic usage. The participant was asked to hand in the questionnaire at the
registration desk on arrival at the consensus meeting. Of the 458 participants, 127
people handed in their form.
One week after the consensus meeting, booklet 2 was sent to those who had
returned the first questionnaire. This time, the questionnaire contained questions
about whether or not they had read the consensus meeting handbook, the amount of
time spent on reading it, and the diagnoses concerning the cases 6 through 10. A
reminder was sent 2 weeks later. The reminder also included a list of the response
percentages for each discipline to encourage participants from disciplines with a low
response rate to return their form. Of the 127 people who replied to the premeeting
questionnaire, 90 responded to the postmeeting inquiry.
Since both the premeeting and postmeeting responses were needed to measure an
effect, the participants who had only responded to the premeeting questionnaire were
dropped from the analysis. Thus, data from 90 respondents were available for further
analysis.
2.4 Classification of Diagnostic Judgements
Since the consensus meeting was also concerned with diagnostic terminology, and the
questionnaire data were also to be used for a qualitative analysis of consensus on
terminology at a later stage, no instruction was given to the participants as to which
terminology or classification should be used. The only instruction was to include all
relevant diagnoses in keywords.
To perform a meaningful quantitative analysis of these diagnoses, we constructed a
classification system according to the following principles: Diagnoses on the
syndrome level and the etiologic level were coded separately. On the syndrome level,
the possibilities were: dementia; cognitive disturbances not labeled as dementia; no
cognitive disturbances; no statement about cognitive functioning. The etiologic level
was classified according to the following causes: primary neurodegenerative;
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cerebrovascular; neurological other than cerebrovascular; internal, such as endocrine
and/or metabolism; drug induced; depression induced; related to psychosocial
factors. Although the term depression is usually adhered to in a syndrome way, for
instance in DSM-III-R, it was used here in an etiologic sense, i.e., as a possible cause
for dementia or cognitive deterioration (cf. "depression-induced dementia"), to avoid
use of the term pseudodementia. Diagnostic statements were thus classified at the
syndrome and etiologic level.
3 RESULTS
3.1 Subject Characteristics
The number of responses were compared with the actual percentage of participants
present during the consensus meeting (Table 1). No significant difference was found
between the response percentage per discipline and the actual percentage per
discipline present during the consensus meeting (Pearson chi-square = 2.024, d f = 5,
p > .8). Because the nonrespondents did not return their form, no additional
comparisons could be made. Since discipline category 6 did not represent a coherent
clinical discipline, this category was dropped from further analysis, leaving 85
respondents.
The data were then checked for differences between disciplines concerning age,
general medical experience, experience in diagnosing dementia, and the reported time
spent in reading the handbook (Table 3). This was done to exclude these factors as
possible causes of differences.
An analysis of variance showed that there was no difference between the disciplines
concerning their age (n = 82, F = 0.693, p> .5, 3 missing cases), or concerning the
number of years of experience in health care (n = 83, F =1.843, p> .1, 2 missing cases).
Mean Experience
Mean Healt Care Mean Hours in Skewness
Discipline N Age, yr Experience, yr Reading, hr of Distribution
neurologists 24 43.8 17.1 2.19 0.587
psychialrists 13 40.3 11.9 2.50 0.529
general physicians 12 39.8 12.1 2.75 -0.422
nursing home physicians 26 40.1 13.1 2.90 0.521
psychologists 10 43.7 13.9 3.39 -1.156
Table 3. Discipline Characteristics.
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There was no significant difference between the reported time spent in reading the
consensus meeting handbook (ANOVA: n = 83, F = 1.843, p> .1, 2 missing cases).
To measure the level of experience in diagnosing dementia we used information
about the time spent per week on this subject. The answers of the respondents were
divided in two range categories: 0 to 3 hours and 4 hours or more per week. A Pearson
chi-square test revealed that the discipline category and the time spent on dementia
diagnostics were significantly associated (chi-square =13.762, df = 4, p <.008). The
skewness of the distribu tions (Table 3) showed that this significant association was
due to the psychologists and general physicians who spent more time on dementia
diagnostics than the other clinicians.
3.2 Levels of Consensus
As a measure of the degree of agreement, the proportion of the number of pairs for
which there was agreement to the possible pairs of assignment was used. The formula
to compute this proportion of agreement (S)" was derived from the method used to
compute the K coefficient of agreement for k raters and n objects." For each discipline
the level of agreement S for each patient on the syndrome diagnoses was calculated.
The results are shown in Figure 1 (see the next page).
To test for differences in premee ting and postmee ting consensus for the syndrome
diagnoses, a (two sided) sign test was used to compare the level of agreement S of
each discipline for the 5 case report pairs, making a total of 30 pairs. This revealed that
there was no significant difference between the premeeting and postmee ting level of
consensus (p > .5). The same was done to test for differences within each discipline.
None of the disciplines, however, demonstrated a significant difference between
premeeting and postmeeting agreement. The same procedure was followed for the
diagnosis at an etiologic level. The results are shown in Figure 2 (see the next page).
The (two sided) Sign Test for differences between premeeting and postmeeting
agreement on the etiologic diagnoses did not show significant differences (p > .9).
The formula to calculate S for each patient is as follows:
S= -------- E n^ (n, - 1)
k(k-1) r'
where k is the number of raters, m is the number of categories, and n^ is the number of raters
in category j. The level of consensus (S) for a patient is thus: the proportion of the number of
pairs for which there is agreement to the possible pairs of assignments.
For example: k=4 raters judge a patient using m=5 categories. If 2 raters chose category 4 and
the two other raters chose catego ry 1 and 2 respectively, then n 1 =1, n2=1, n3=0 and n4=2.
Using the summa tion part of the formula above this yields 2. Multiplying 2 with the first
part, i.e. 1/12, of the formula yields 2/12, i.e. an agreement of .167.
If all 4 raters would have chosen the same category, then the proportion would have been
12/12, i.e. an agreement of 1.
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Level of Consensus
Figure 2. Level of consensus on etiologic diagnoses before and after the consensus
meeting.
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Differences within each discipline were again tested. None of the disciplines, however,
showed a significant difference between premeeting and postmeeting agreement.
A (two sided) sign test showed that the level of consensus for syndrome diagnoses
was significantly higher than for the etiology diagnoses (p < .001). Since 66% (59 out of
90) of the respondents had (sometimes partly) read the consensus meeting handbook
before the meeting and before they filled in the first questionnaire, we analyzed the
level of agreement between the readers and non-readers: no significant differences
were found.
In summary, we found: (1) no significant differences existed between the disciplines
concerning health care experience, age, or time invested in reading the syllabus; (2)
general physicians and psychologists spent significantly more time on dementia
diagnostics than physicians of the other disciplines; (3) there was no significant
difference between or within the discipline categories on premeeting and postmeeting
level of consensus for both syndrome and etiologic diagnoses; and (4) there was
significantly more consensus on syndrome than on etiologic diagnoses.
3.3 Differences in Diagnostic Classification
We were also interested in the difference between disciplines concerning the nature of
their diagnosis. The hypothesis was that some disciplines would show a special
interest in particular information, resulting in a preference for certain diagnoses. The
miscellaneous discipline category was dropped from the analysis, since that group
could not meaningfully be compared with a discipline in daily practice.
The Waller-Duncan K-ratio t test was used to analyze the data. 12
 This test makes it
possible to compare means of several groups at the same time, while minimizing the
Bayes risk under additive loss. This means that a correction is made, using Bayes
Theorem, for the increased chance of finding significant differences due to multiple
comparisons " For the syndrome diagnoses, the results showed that psychiatrists and
nursing home physicians differed from neurologists in that they made a diagnosis
without further specification significantly more often. (Table 4, see the next page)
•
 A Walier grouping expresses the ordered differences found by the Waller-Duncan K-
ratio t-test. For example, in Table 4, the mean score of the neurologists (letter B) differs
from that of the psychiatrists (letter A), but not from the mean score of the
psychologists (letter A and B).
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Discipline N Mean Waller Grouping
psychiatrists 13 1.923 A
nursing home physicians 26 1.846 A
general physicians 12 1.500 A B
psychologists 10 1.200 A B
neurologists 24 0.625 B
K ratio=100, df=80, MSE=1.632, F=3.25, T=2.102
(Means with the same letter are not significantly different)
Table 4. Differences in the use of syndrome diagnoses
without specification
For the diagnosis Alzheimer's type dementia the situation was almost reversed. This
diagnosis was made significantly more often by neurologists than by any of the other
physicians, with the largest difference being between the neurologists and the
psychiatrists (Table 5).
Discipline N Mean Waller Grouping
neurologists 24 3.667 A
psychologists 10 2.400 B
general physicians 12 2.250 B
nursing home physicians 26 2.154 B
psychiatrists 13 1.846 B
K ratio=100, df=80, MSE=2.638, F=3.951 T=2.068
(Means with the same letter are not significantly different)
Table 5. Differences in the use of the Diagnosis Alzheimer's
Type Dementia.
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Diagnoses with medication and/or intoxication as etiology were also used
differently by physicians of the various disciplines. General physicians and nursing
home physicians made this diagnosis significantly more often than psychologists and
psychiatrists, while the neurologists held a middle position (Table 6).
Discipline N Mean Waller Grouping
general physicians 12 1.333 A
nursing home physicians 26 1.154 A
neurologists 24 0.792 A B
psychologists 10 0.400 B
psychiatrists 13 0.385 B
K ratio=100, df=80, MSE=0.794, F=3.179 T=2.159
(Means with the same letter are not significantly different)
Table 6. Differences in the use of the diagnosis Medication-
/Intoxication
The diagnosis depression was used significantly more often by psychiatrists than by
neurologists, while the other disciplines occupied a middle position (Table 7).
For the diagnoses cerebrovascular, neurologic, somatic, and psychosocial disorders, no
significant differences were found between the disciplines. However, none of the
psychologists made diagnoses in the somatic category.
Discipline N Mean Waller Grouping
psychiatrists 13 2.923 A
general physicians 12 2.500 A B
nursing home physicians 26 2.192 A B
psychologists 10 2.100 A B
neurologists 24 1.708 B
K ratio=100, df=80, MSE=1.523, F=2.262 T=2.332
(Means with the same letter are not significantly different)
Table 7. Differences in the use of the diagnosis depression
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4 DISCUSSION
The present study addressed questions concerning (1) the level of agreement or
consensus between medical disciplines in differential diagnosis of dementia; (2) the
differences in the use of diagnostic classes on the syndrome and etiologic level; and (3)
the effect of a consensus meeting in obtaining consensus. With respect to the first
question, the quantitative data demonstrate that it was significantly more difficult to
reach agreement on an etiologic than on a syndrome level. However, it should be
noted that the differences between the syndrome and etiologic consensus can be partly
explained by the number of possible categories to choose from. For each syndrome,
there are several etiologic explanations, thus making it possible, by chance alone, to
have more different diagnoses where etiology is concerned. Moreover, the data clearly
show that the disciplines did not differ in their level of agreement, but that the
agreement within each discipline was based on different diagnoses on both the
syndrome and etiologic level. This finding is important because it is the first time that
quantitative differences in differential diagnostics between disciplines have been
reported. Furthermore, it gives additional impetus to the necessity of improving
diagnostic competence in the field of dementia. Apart from the organization of
consensus meetings, continuing education seems obligatory.
There were striking differences between the disciplines with regard to the second
question. It is apparent that the various disciplines focus upon different aspects of the
dementia syndrome and its multidimensional facets. Psychiatrists and nursing home
physicians gave diagnoses at the syndrome level significantly more often than
neurologists did, i.e., diagnoses without further specification of the etiology. However,
when psychiatrists gave a cause for cognitive dysfunctions, they used the diagnosis
"depression" significantly more often than neurologists. Neurologists, however, used
the diagnosis "Alzheimer's disease" significantly more often than physicians of the
other disciplines. General physicians and nursing home physicians considered
medication or intoxication as a cause of cognitive disorders significantly more often
than psychiatrists and psychologists did.
These findings are of importance because of their probable cause: it is likely that the
diagnoses primarily reflect the medical specialization of the diagnostician, and thus
his or her medical knowledge and experience. For example, depression is of special
interest to psychiatrists, while neurologists are more interested in Alzheimer's disease.
A similar finding was reported by Lopez et al. 13, who also found that neurologists
and psychiatrists varied in their interpretation of standardized patient data, e.g. "(...)
differing interpretation of the significance of symptoms, differing importance given to
comorbid conditions, or differing interpretations of the diagnostic criteria"(P.'52"
It should be noted that no opinion is given in this study as to which diagnoses were
correct: as mentioned above, the different specialists appear to focus upon different
aspects of the multidimensional condition. A follow-up study addresses this question
more specifically. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the disciplines did not
differ on all etiologic diagnoses. The etiologic diagnoses on which there was
agreement were: cerebral vascular disorders, neurologic disorders other than
cerebrovascular, somatic disorders (with the exception of the psychologists who never
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used this diagnosis) and psychosocial disorders. The differences concerned the
frequency of the use of syndrome diagnoses without further specification, and the
frequency of the use of the following etiologic diagnoses: Alzheimer's disease,
medication and intoxication, and depression.
With respect to the third question addressed by this study: a significant difference
between the level of diagnostic agreement before and after the consensus meeting
could not be established. It should be stressed that this does not mean that consensus
meetings are without value. It is possible that this particular consensus meeting was
not effective, or that the time interval of 2 weeks (1 week before and 1 week after the
meeting) might have been too short to change the use of diagnostic criteria and jargon.
However, it does not seem probable that the lack of significant effects was caused by
the fact that several respondents had already read part of the consensus handbook,
because no significant differences were found between those respondents who read
the syllabus before the meeting and those who did not.
There are several implications of the findings presented here. The differences
reported in this study confirm the notion that a multidisciplinary committee is needed
to avoid the diagnosis and classification of dementia from being biased by the medical
specialization of the diagnostician. The fact that clinicians within the same discipline
tend to agree with each other on diagnostic classes makes it imperative that physicians
from other disciplines are asked for a second opinion to reduce the chance of
overlooking or underestimating evidence which might suggest other diagnoses. This
means that the present referral policy should be changed such that a multidisciplinary
approach will become regular practice." Incidentally, the reemergence of
neuropsychiatry as a specialty between neurology and psychiatry might also be of
relevance in this respect. 15
 An additional implication is that continuing education in
the field of dementia might be necessary. It is especially important to teach medical
specialists about those aspects of the multifaceted conditions of dementia that are not
usually taken into consideration in their own specialty. This notion will be
investigated in a follow-up study which will examine the effect of using the expert
system EVINCE as a diagnostic aid in education and clinical practice. 16 Lastly, the
fact that the consensus meeting had no measurable effect does not mean that
consensus meetings are without value. As stated before, the lack of significant results
could be because of the short time interval between the meeting and the second
questionnaire, a long-term follow-up might reveal changes in consensus, if it is
possible to control interfering factors. Consensus meetings undoubtedly play an
important role in the integration of disciplinary expertise about complex medical
controversies. This, in turn might increase the knowledge of the participants so that
they are capable of formulating clinically sound criteria for the assessment of the
multidimensional condition of dementia, and subsequently improve their own clinical
management.
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VII
 DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF DEMENTIA:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EXPERT SYSTEM
EVINCE AND CLINICIANS.*
1 INTRODUCTION
The diagnosis of dementia and dementing diseases is based on neurological and
psychiatric findings, but is usually made by physicians from one discipline. In a
previous study, we showed that such a monodisciplinary approach had a significant
effect on the type of diagnoses made.' We compared the diagnoses of neurologists,
psychiatrists, nursing home physicians, general physicians and psychologists, and
found that neurologists made the diagnosis of Alzheimer's Disease more frequently
than clinicians of any of the other disciplines. Consistent with, for example, DSM-III-R
guidelines, psychiatrists used the diagnosis of depression more often than
neurologists, while the other disciplines took a middle position. 2 Furthermore,
psychiatrists and nursing home physicians more often made a syndrome diagnosis
without an etiologic diagnosis than did neurologists.
These findings are consistent with the results reported by Hoffman 3 and by Verhey
et a14, who all found that a thorough multidisciplinary neuropsychiatric examination
resulted in a therapeutically important alteration in the referring diagnosis (41 % and
45% respectively). The reemergence of neuropsychiatry is an important step towards
a solution for such discipline-related diagnostic biases. However, there are more
complicating factors in the diagnosis of dementia. Although international criteria have
been developed to improve the consensus on the definitions of dementia, these criteria
are only slowly being applied, if at all, in daily practice. Furthermore, there is a lack of
consensus on the selection and weighing of data, and on the examination procedure.
For instance, in the NINCDS/ADRDA criteria no consensus could be reached about
the selection of the neuropsychological methods to be used.'
One way to improve dementia diagnostics and classification is to use computer
controlled medical protocols to gather the data.` However, these programs are
usually sophisticated data bases with a disadvantage: the data set requested by the
program is always the same, irrespective of patient characteristics. Moreover, these
programs do not incorporate knowledge on data integration, detection of data
inconsistencies or data relevance.
In a review of computer-based decision aids, Morelli et al.' compared five
prominent decision-making paradigms: data bank analysis, statistical pattern
recognition, Bayesian analysis, the logical flow chart, and knowledge-based expert
systems. In their conclusions they stated that "the expert system approach appears to
This chapter was published in: Plugge LA, Verhey FRJ, Dolles J. Differential Diagnosis of
Dementia: A Comparison Between the Expert System Evince and Clinicians. Journal of
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 1991; 3, 4: 398-404.
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be the most promising. Its main strengths are 1) the ability to incorporate different
kinds of knowledge into the decision-making process, 2) the ability to mimic the way
humans reason about a problem, 3) the ability to explain and justify the system's
conclusions..."."P.'66'
Based on these considerations the neuropsychiatric expert system Evince was
developed. Evince is based on international rules and criteria for dementia diagnostics
as described in the DSM-III-R and proposed by the NINCDS-ADRDA Work Group.2'5
A neuropsychiatrist (the domain expert) -the second author of this paper- provided
the expertise in applying these rules and criteria. A first evaluation showed that the
diagnoses produced by Evince showed a high level of agreement with those made by
the domain expert.$
After this first evaluation Evince was developed further. To test this expanded
version of Evince, an evaluation experiment was set up involving a multidisciplinary
committee of three expert clinicians and 85 clinicians from 5 different disciplines. The
multidisciplinary expert committee (MEC) provided diagnoses as a reference for
comparison with the diagnoses of Evince and of the 85 clinicians. The hypothesis was
that Evince would make more correct diagnoses (i.e., the number of diagnoses that are
in agreement with those of the MEC) than the average clinician taking part in the
experiment. Thus, the performance levels of the experts and the 85 clinicians would
provide an upper and a lower limit to decide whether the expert system's
performance was acceptable.
2 METHODS
2.1
 Subjects
The subjects were participants in a consensus meeting on the differential diagnosis of
dementia organized by the Dutch National Organization for Quality Assurance in
Hospitals (CBO) in the Netherlands, in November 1988. Each of the 458 registered
participants was asked to cooperate in an inquiry concerning the present state of
dementia diagnostics. As the inquiry data were to be used in a more extensive study
on the use of classification in dementia diagnostics, the inquiry was devided in two
parts - one before and one after the consensus meeting. Of the 458 participants, 127
people handed in their first form, and of these 127, 90 filled out and returned their
second inquiry form.
Based on information provided by the participants for the registration office of the
CBO, 85 respondents represented 5 disciplinary categories: 1) neurologists,
2) psychiatrists, 3) general physicians, 4) nursing home physicians, and 5) psy-
chologists, leaving a residual category of five respondents that was dropped from the
analysis. The data from the 85 respondents were used in this study.
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2.2 Materials
Ten case descriptions were selected from the patient records of the Maastricht
Memory Clinic. The cases were selected so that both classical and more complex cases
were present, and with different levels of severity of the cognitive -or memory-
disorder.
Each case description was formulated in terms of a standard medical report and
contained all information necessary to make a diagnosis according to standard
research criteria recommended by the DSM-III-R and the NINCDS/ADRDA work
group. 2 '5 This information was incorporated in the following paragraphs: 1)
introduction, 2) past history, 3) anamnesis, 4) anamnesis as reported by a partner or a
close member of the family, 5) psychiatrie and neurological history, 6) medical history,
7) medication data, 8) intoxication data, 9) psychosocial data, 10) daily functioning, 11)
physical examination, 12) neurological examination, 13) psychiatrie examination,
14) blood examination, 15) neuropsychological examination, 16) additional
examination (e.g., CT-scan, chest x-ray, EEG, or ECG). To guarantee the patient's
privacy, any information that might identify the patient was either changed or
omitted. Each participant was asked to answer questions concerning his or her age,
years of medical experience, discipline, nature of medical practice, hours per week
spent on differential diagnosis and classification of patients suspected of suffering
from dementia. Finally, after examining the case descriptions, the participants were
asked to write down their diagnoses on the form.
2.3 Multidisciplinary Expert Committee.
To establish a reference for comparison of the diagnoses, an independent
multidisciplinary committee of three expert clinicians was established, consisting of a
neurologist, a psychiatrist, and a psychologist. Each member of the MEC received the
same 10 patient case description and was asked to study the data and formulate
diagnoses. The MEC was then given the opportunity to discuss these diagnoses in a
joint conference to reach a consensus on the final diagnoses. The MEC was asked to
state the diagnoses at both the syndrome and the etiologic level. The conference lasted
aproximately 4 hours. The MEC reached a consensus for all patients, except for the
etiologic diagnoses of patients number 4 and 6. (See Tabel 1 on the next page.)
2.4 Classification of Diagnostic Judgement
The consensus meeting was also concerned with diagnostic terminology; the inquiry
data were going to be used for qualitative analysis of agreement on terminology at a
later stage. No instruction was given to the participants as to which terminology or
classification they should use. The only instruction given was to include all relevant
diagnoses in key words.
To perform a meaningful quantitative analysis of these diagnoses, we constructed a
classification system according to the following principles: Diagnoses on the
syndrome level and the etiologic level were coded separately. On the syndrome level,
the possibilities included 1) dementia, 2) cognitive disturbances not termed dementia,
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MEC Evince
Case Sex Age Syndrome Etiology Syndrome Etiology
1 F 74 Moderate Probable AD Mild AD
dementia, dementia,
depressive mild
symptoms depression
2 F 80 Moderate Probable AD, Moderate AD
dementia neuroleptic- dementia
induced
parkinsonism
3 M 78 Severe MID, neuroleptic- Moderate MID
dementia. induced dementia
parkinsonism
4 F 66 Mild dementia Possible AD, or Mild dementia Major depression
Major Depression (possibly
medication-
induced),
bereavement
5 F 71 Slight cognitive History of CVA, Cognitive Vascular
deficit (no adjustment deficit (no problems,
dementia) disorder with dementia) dysthymic
depressive disorder
symptoms
6 M 62 Slight cognitive History of TIA, Cognitive Vascular problems
deficit (no or mood disorder deficit (no
dementia) dementia)
7 F 80 Severe Probable AD Severe AD
dementia dementia
8 F 86 Mild dementia MID Mild dementia MID
with depression
9 M 72 Mild dementia Possible AD, MID, Mild dementia AD, depression
depression
10 M 67 Moderate MID Moderate MID
dementia dementia
Note: AD=Alzheimer's disease; CVA=cerebrovascular accident; MID=Multi-infarct
dementia; TIA=transient ischemic attack.
1
and the Expert System Evince.
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3) no cognitive disturbances, and 4) no statement about cognitive functioning.
The etiologic level was classified according to the following causes: 1) primary
neurodegenerative, 2) cerebrovascular, 3) neurological other than 2, 4) internal, such
as endocrine and/ or metabolism, 5) drug induced, 6) depression-induced, 7) related to
psychosocial factors. Although the term depression usually is used to mean a syndrome
(for instance, in DSM-III-R), it is used here in an etiologic sense, i.e. as a possible cause
for dementia or cognitive deterioration (cf., "depression-induced dementia"). This
makes it possible to avoid the term pseudodementia. Thus, the diagnostic statements of
the 85 clinicians, the MEC and Evince were classified at the syndrome and etiologic
level.
3 THE EXPERT SYSTEM EVINCE.
Evince was developed with the expert system tool Acquaint. 9 The minimum
requirements for Evince are as follows: an IBM PC-compatible microcomputer
(preferably an AT), with a minimum of 520 Kbytes of RAM (640 Kbytes of RAM is
recommended), two floppy drives (a hard-disk drive is recommended), and MS-DOS
or PC-DOS version 2.1 or later. Evince can be used with a monochrome or a color
monitor.
Evince is a package consisting of the actual program, i.e., the inference engine and
user interface, and three knowledge modules. In Module 1 the user can decide to
consult Evince in batch mode (i.e., let Evince diagnose the preentered data of one or
more patients) or in interactive mode (i.e., the system asks questions and the user
provides the answers). The Modules 2 and 3 consist of the procedural knowledge
depicted in Figure 1. These two modules embody 28 contexts, 110 rules and 129
concepts. Additionally, these two modules use 143 formulas, i.e., functions which
perform calculations, window and file management, etc. Because the knowledge
modules are separate from the actual program, they can also be stored separately (e.g.
on a network) to prevent unauthorized use.
Knowledge in Evince is represented in rule and concept frames. Concept frames
represent the knowledge of patient data, while the rules embody the procedural
knowledge. When the value of a concept is unknown to the system and required by a
rule, it will either be inferred whenever possible or requested from the user. A rule
consists of an IF and a THEN part. The IF part compares the concept value with the
test value, and triggers the THEN part of the rule when the values match. Each
concept value has a certainty attached to it; for example "maybe" = 50, and "unknown"
= 0. These values range between -100 (absolutely false) and 100 (absolutely true) and
are used to assess with how much certainty a conclusion can be drawn. Additionally,
each conclusion has a "certainty" value that informs the system how certain that
conclusion is when the premises are absolutely true. Consequently, the lower the
certainty of the premises, the lower the certainty of the conclusion.
As stated in the introduction, Evince was developed further on the basis of the
results of a previous experiment. The knowledge base was extended to include
knowledge about disorders that can be related to medication. 1 ° The diagnostic
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capabilities on the subject of depression were refined with DSM-III-R criteria, and
were extended to include the diagnosis "dysthymic disorder". The knowledge about
dementia was reorganized to investigate the level of deterioration, which then would
lead to the diagnosis of dementia or amnesic syndrome. This resulted in a hierarchical
examination protocol consisting of diagnostic topics called "contexts" (See Figure 1,
page 43).
Each context governs a set of rules and sometimes one or more subcontexts (or child
contexts). A context is in fact a higher order rule that establishes whether it is worth
checking its subordinate rules and contexts. If the system considers a context
irrelevant, then all the subordinate rules and contexts will also be considered
irrelevant. For example, the context "Mood" tries to establish whether there is reason
to assume that the patient is depressed. If this is not the case, then all child contexts
will be ignored. However, some contexts will always be examined because they
concern information that is considered relevant (i.e., the contexts "Registration",
" Medication", and "Lab-Tests"). An other context that always is used is the
"Evaluation" context. In this context, all the diagnostic information gathered from the
previous contexts is collected, checked for inconsistencies and mutual consequences,
and finally transformed into natural language statements. These statements are then
printed in the form of a report. The last context is called "End" and gives the user the
opportunity to ask the system how the presented conclusions were reached. It should
be noted that such questions can also be asked during the actual (interactive)
consultation.
4 RESULTS
Table 2 (see the next page) shows the number and percentage of respondents
compared with those present during the consensus meeting. None of the disciplines
within the respondents was over- or under-represented in comparison with the
number of participants per discipline.
The MEC reached a consensus on the syndrome diagnosis for all 10 patients.
However, the MEC did not reach a consensus on the etiologic diagnosis for the
patients 4 and 6. Two etiologic diagnoses were given for these patient (Table 1). A
diagnosis made by the clinicians or Evince was considered "correct" if the diagnosis
was made by the MEC (Table 1). Thus, 10 points could be scored for the syndrome,
and 10 points for the etiologic diagnoses. The diagnoses were not compared for the
level of severity of the demential syndrome, or for the use of the classifications
"possible" and "probable" for Alzheimer's disease because these frequently were
omitted by the 85 clinicians. Comparison of the syndrome diagnoses of the 85
clinicians with the MEC revealed that they had a mean±SD of 7.6±1.4 correct
diagnoses (n=85; range 5-10). No differences were found between the disciplines (See
Table 3).
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discipline category
No. of
participants
No. of
respondents
neurologists 100 (22%) 24 (27%)
psychiatrists 57 (13%) 13 (14%)
general physicians 74 (16%) 12 (13%)
nursing home physicians 133 (29%) 26 (29%)
psychologists 66 (14%) 10 (11%)
Other 28 (6%) 5 (6%)
Total 458 (100%) 90 (100%)
The residual category Others was dropped from the analyses,
leaving a total of 85 respondents.
Table 2. Number of participants and respondents in
absolute figures and percentage of total.
Discipline category N Mean sd range
neurologists 24 7.833 1.31 5-10
psychologists 10 7.667 1.37 5-10
general physicians 12 7.654 1.33 5-10
nursing home physicians 26 7.300 1.83 5-10
psychiatrists 13 7.100 1.44 5-9
ble 3. Mean number of svndrome diagnoses in
agreement with the MEC.
Discipline category N Mean sd Waller Grouping
ncurologists 24 6.208 1.38 A
psychologists 10 5.900 1.52 A B
general physicians 12 4.917 1.38 B C
nursing home physicians 26 4.885 1.68 B C
psychiatrists 13 4.615 1.94 C
K-ratio=100, df=80, MSE=2.518, F=3.53, T=2.11
Table 4. Mean number of etiolozic diagnoses in agreement
with the MEC.
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Evince diagnosed all 10 case descriptions correctly, i.e., in agreement with the MEC.
However, when the level of severity of the demential syndrome was taken into
account, it was revealed that Evince considered patients 1 and 3 to be less severely
demented than did the MEC (i.e., mild vs. moderate). Furthermore, Evince did not
provide a level of severity for cognitive deficits (patients 5 and 6) because it was not
designed to do so. (See the two right columns of Table 1.) On the etiologic level, the 85
clinicians reached a mean of 5.3±1.7 correct diagnoses (n=85; range 1-8). Evince,
however, made all 10 etiologic diagnoses in agreement with the expert committee
(Table 1). However, Evince did not use the classification "possible" and "probable", as
did the expert committee. (The present new version incorporates rules to enable the
use of such a distinction.) Furthermore, in contrast to the MEC panel, Evince did not
make the diagnosis multi-infarct dementia for patient number 9. The MEC decided
that this diagnosis should not be excluded completely, given the finding of a small
hypodensity on the CT-scan. In accordance with international consensus, Evince did
not consider the CT-scan finding alone sufficient to make the diagnosis multi-infarct
dementia, since the patient's history and examination did not reveal a cerebrovascular
accident.
With respect to the etiologic diagnoses, a significant difference was found between
the disciplines concerning the number of etiologic diagnoses that agreed with the
expert committee. Neurologists had significantly more correct etiologic diagnoses than
clinicians of the other disciplines, except for psychologists (see Table 4).
5 DISCUSSION.
The results showed that the average clinician made fewer etiologic diagnoses than
syndrome diagnoses that were in agreement with the MEC. This can be explained
partly by the fact that there are fewer choices in the laffer. Thus, it is possible to have a
lower score for the etiologic diagnoses by chance. However, the diagnostic
performance of Evince was not affected by these differences in chance. Furthermore,
the average score of the clinicians for both syndrome and etiologic diagnoses was
considerably lower than the score of Evince. Although the diagnosis of Alzheimer's
type dementia is predominantly made on the basis of exclusion criteria, there are
positive criteria, such as an insidious onset and the absence of a clouded
consciousness. Therefore, it was possible for Evince to reject the diagnosis Alzheimer's
type dementia, even when none of the other diagnoses were applicable, i.e.,
Alzheimer's type dementia was not treated as a'waste bucket' diagnosis.
Another important finding is the disciplinary differente found in the number of
diagnoses that were in agreement with the MEC, specifically the difference between
psychiatrists and neurologists. Both neurologists and psychologists had significantly
more etiologic diagnoses in agreement with the MEC than did psychiatrists. Our
previous study' on interdisciplinary differences revealed that psychiatrists more often
made a syndrome diagnosis without an etiologic diagnosis, in contrast to the
neurologists. This difference between neurologists and psychiatrists was also seen in
the present study. The possibility that this difference is due to level of experience
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and/or involvement in dementia diagnostics could not be established. There was no
significant difference between disciplines concerning their health care experience. A
significant difference was found concerning the time spent on dementia diagnostics
(chi-square=13.76, df=5, p<.008); psychologists and general physicians spent more
time on dementia diagnostics than the other disciplines. However, this does not
explain the discrepancy between neurologists and psychiatrists. A more plausible
cause of interdisciplinary difference would be the fact that the 85 clinicians were not
given the opportunity to discuss the cases to develop multidisciplinary consensus.
However, this monodisciplinary approach does not deviate from what is common
practice at present. The question as to whether the difference between neurologists
and psychiatrists might be due to the nature of the medical specialization and to the
clinicians' experience, is the subject of a forthcoming study.
The number of patients used in this evaluation, can be considered relatively small in
comparison with the (few) other ES evaluations. However, compared with medical
comparison studies, this number is quite acceptable, particularly given the number of
observers involved." U12•13
 In order to obtain the voluntary cooperation of clinicians
outside the research institution, the number of patients to be diagnosed must be kept
to a methodologically acceptable minimum.
Although most clinicians are familiar with written case reports as an alternative to
seeing the real patient, it is possible that this has had a negative influence on their
results. However, it should be noted that the standardized patient information was
given to both the 85 clinicians and the MEC panel. As Lopez et al. have remarked, this
ensures a reduction of variante stemming from the patients and the clinicians.14
Another possible cause for the low etiologic performance of the clinicians might be the
rather low response rate. Although 85 (67%) out of 127 clinicians responded to both
the first and the second inquiry, they account for only 18% of the total number of
participants. However, it should be noted that the participants who responded both
times considered themselves competent, while others returned an empty form with
the remark that they were too inexperienced. A more plausible cause for the low
average score can be found in a studies by Chimowitz et al.' S,Voytovich et al. 1 ' and
Friedlander et al."' 18 who found that diagnostic errors are related to reasoning
mechanism such as "premature closure" (i.e. premature diagnostic conclusions) and
"anchoring" (i.e. adhere to an initial hypothesis despite subsequent contradicting or
inconsistent evidente).
Although the diagnoses made by the MEC could not be compared with postmortem
and/or long-term follow-up data, it is thought that these diagnoses were reliable,
because the three clinicians involved were recognized experts in their discipline, and
they had ample opportunity to discuss each case thoroughly. As mentioned in the
introduction, the overall results of this experiment are in agreement with those
described by Hoffman3 and Verhey et al. 4, who assessed referral diagnoses of
behavioral disorders with a multidisciplinary team.
The aim of comparing Evince with human clinicians was to assess the performance
of the system, not to show that an expert system can replace the human clinician.
Although expert systems are able to mimic human reasoning, they (still) lack
important human capabilities (such as intuition), as well as the vast amount of world
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knowledge. However, the results warrant the conclusion that the implemented
neurological, psychiatric and psychological knowledge was successfully applied by
Evince with the material presented, and that the system can assist clinicians in
diagnosing dementia. As Hoffman observed: "it is clear that the techniques of
neuropsychiatrie diagnosis have currently advanced to the point where a major
limitation exists in their knowledge of application.......
(p96?
 However, as Teitelbaum
noted, we cannot expect clinicians to be experts in all disciplines. 79 Nevertheless, they
should be able to recognize situations that demand referral and collaboration. A
computer-based decision aid like Evince could help to achieve this. It provides the
human clinician the opportunity to apply up-to-date knowledge of internationally
approved standard criteria, and it can help to make the clinician aware of the decision
process involved and provide a useful check for completeness of the necessary
information. Furthermore, it offers the clinician a tool to integrate expert diagnostic
information from different disciplines.
Although it is unlikely that expert systems will replace the human clinician, due to
the limitations noted earlier, it is to be expected that, in the near future, expert systems
will play an important role in assisting medical diagnostics. 20 '21 However, before
expert systems are given such an important function in medical diagnostics, their
performance should be thoroughly tested, both in laboratory and in field situations.
Therefore, collaborative studies have been initiated to compare the diagnoses made by
Evince both retrospectively and prospectively with clinical and post mortem
diagnoses, and to test the system in field situations. Finally, the authors welcome other
proposals for collaborative studies, particularly from outside the Netherlands.
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VIII DiscuSSioN.
1 INTRODUCTION.
In the preceding chapters a description was given of the development and the phased
laboratory evaluation of a neuropsychiatric expert system for the diagnosis of
dementia, along with an assessment of the agreement among clinicians and a
comparison of their judgements with a panel of human experts. The result of the first
evaluation showed that the expert system performed at a level comparable to the
performance of the domain expert whose knowledge was used to develop the system
(Chapter V). The second experiment showed that the diagnosis of dementia is
hampered by discipline related disagreements between clinicians (Chapter VI). In the
third experiment the expert system showed capable of an interdisciplinary
performance comparable to that of a panel of three external (from other institutions)
human experts from different disciplines and better than that of 85 clinicians from
several disciplines (Chapter VII). In this last experiment it was also shown that Evince
can handle not only the classic cases, but also notoriously difficult cases, such as those
where a choice has to be made between an early stage of dementia or benign memory
complaints. This is especially important, because clinicians will benefit more from a
system that is able to aid in diagnosing difficult cases than in diagnosing easier classic
cases. Additionally, Evince proved capable of handling the notoriously difficult
problem of a depression coinciding with memory complaints.
The implication of these results is that neither the multi-disciplinary approach, nor -
as suggested by Morelli et al. and Werner^ z- the lack of hard physiological criteria
and the predominant use of descriptive criteria, is necessarily an obstacle for the
development of an expert system. The positive resuits also show that the performance
of a medical expert system using relatively inexpensive commercial software and a
simple desk-top IBM PC-XT compatible computer should not a priori be dismissed as
inferior to systems developed with the aid of expensive soft- and hardware using
megabytes of memory and powerful processors.
However, not unlike its human counterparts, Evince is not perfect. Several aspects
of the results, our approach and the problems encountered deserve additional
discussion which is provided in the remainder of this chapter.
2 TWO ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXPERT SYSTEM APPROACH
In chapter I a short overview was given of expert systems in general and previous
attempts to use this tool in psychiatry. Chapter I did not discuss other possible ways
of providing the clinician with computerized support, because there is a large array of
such support programs, ranging from straightforward billing programs up to Al
applications, and because this study was aimed at the development and evaluation of
an expert system. However, the expert system approach for medical decision support
is not free from criticism, and has led to the development of alternative decision
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2.1 The Catalyst Model
One major criticism of the ES approach is that it resembles the classical Greek oracles
like the one in the city of Delphi where the god Apollo could be asked for advice.3
This metaphor depicts the ES as a kind of 'black box' that treats the physician as an
ignorant person who is required to transfer all of his available knowledge to the
system and wait for the machine to speak. The solution proposed by Miller and
Masarie is a "catalyst model" that "can facilitate the physician overcoming the difficult
limiting step. ixPZ) In this model the physician decides which diagnostic steps to take
and which steps require diagnostic support. The computer program keeps track of the
"physicians deliberations by providing decision support tools for selected steps in the
physician's diagnostic reasoning. i3IP 2 Although this catalyst approach seems intuitive,
there are some problems. The Greek Oracle allegory as a characterization of expert
systems, has two important flaws. Firstly, Greek Oracles typically gave cryptic and
ambiguous answers and did not provide an explanation of their answer. Even though
it can not be excluded that an answer from an expert system, nor any other decision
aiding system, can be ambiguous, this is normally not the case with expert systems.
Secondly, Greek Oracles did not require the consulting person to be knowledgeable on
the problem matter. ESs on the other hand do require that the user has professional
knowledge of the subject at hand, albeit that it does not require the user to be an
expert. In one of their studies Bankowitz et al. explicitly state that physicians must be
familiar with the limitations of the system, in their case the Quick Medical Reference
(QMR), and must be capable of overriding inappropriate suggestions 4 This capability
applies equally for users of expert systems.
An important problem with the Catalyst model is that it requires the physician to
know when he should consult the system, i.e. when his knowledge is inadequate. This
means that the system will not be consulted when the physician erroneously thinks he
made a correct decision. Due to discipline related biases as reported in chapter VI,
such a situation is bound to occur.
2.2 The Critiquing Approach
A second alternative approach is the use of a critiquing system. In this approach the
system requests the physician to enter his plan (or diagnosis) and reasons for these
plans, which are then commented on by the system. This technique resembles the
catalyst approach in that it uses only the data given on the physician's initiative.
Therefore, such a system only evaluates the data considered relevant by the
physician .5 As shown in this study, disciplinary differences alone are sufficient reason
to ask for more data than those considered relevant by he consulted physician.
Furthermore, the amount of knowledge that a critiquing model needs seems seriously
underestimated, as it must be able to keep track of the physician's deliberations, which
entails more than simply knowing which step the physician is going to take next. It
means that the system must have knowledge of the physician's policy and rationale,
and be able to trace the physician's deliberations backward to check previous
assumptions and decisions.
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3 EVALUATION: PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND SOLUTIONS CHOSEN
At the beginning (early 1987) of the project described in this study, evaluation of
decision-support systems was only scarcely debated. However, during the last few
years the subject of decision-support systems has gained much more interest, as
evidenced by recently published special issues of, for example, Methods of
Information in Medicine (1990, vol 29, nr 4) and Medical Informatics (1990, vol 15, nr
3). It is also encouraging to see that ideas about evaluation methods that were
developed independent from each other have very much in common and complement
each other, for example, the method suggested by Wyatt and Spiegelhalterb and the
one used in this study. In the following sections we will elaborate on some aspects of
the expert system evaluation method used in this study.
3.1 Level of performance
In previous evaluation studies of medical expert systems the developers tried to assess
the system's performance by comparing it with expert clinicians, or with clinicians
without providing information as to how experienced these clinicians were. However,
as expert systems are generally not meant to be used by human experts, it is of the
utmost importance to find out what the minimum performance of a decision-support
system must be in order to be an aid to the non-expert. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study where the performance of an expert system was explicitly
compared to that of both experts and domain-competent non-experts in order to
establish an upper and lower limit of performance for determining the potential use of
the system. How well the 85 clinicians performed in comparison with the expert panel
and, consequently, with Evince, is shown in Figures 1 and 2 on the next page.
Even on the syndrome diagnoses, where the 85 clinicians showed a higher level of
agreement with the expert panel, the performance of Evince is better than that of the
majority of the clinicians (possible reasons for this proficiency will be discussed
further on in this chapter).
3.2 The patient cases used in the experiments
In this study cases from the institution that developed the expert system were used for
the evaluation experiments. Although this is common practice at the moment, it
would be better to have a more diverse source. For this reason, the development of a
reference library containing standardized cases from different countries would be
desirable. However, the development of such a reference library is a major project th at
demands large scale cooperation to establish some standardization before such a
library can be developed, a task which was far beyond the possibilities within this
study.'
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Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Clinicians with Etiology Diagnoses that are in
Agreement with the Expert Panel.
Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of Clinicians with Syndrome Diagnoses that are
in Agreement with the Expert Panel.
The number of cases, and the variation in the cases, is another major problem. Due
to the large number of parameters used in dementia diagnostics and in the expert
system it is impossible to cover every possible combination of these parameters by
creating or selecting patient cases. Furthermore, the number of cases that could be
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used in the second evaluation experiment was limited due to the number of people
that were asked to voluntary cooperate in diagnosing these cases, i.e., the participants
of the consensus meeting. The higher the number of cases used, the less likely it would
be that a large number of people would have cooperated due to the amount of time
required to judge these cases. Given these limiting factors, the second evaluation
experiment used stratified random cases as a practical alternative during the
laboratory testing stage. In this second evaluation experiment the cases were stratified
according to severity of the cognitive disorder, i.e. two cases of severe dementia, two
cases with a cognitive deficit (no dementia), three moderate and three mild cases of
dementia. Furthermore, cases with the following etiologies were selected: Alzheimer's
Dementia, Multi-infarct Dementia and depression. The individual selection of the
cases was random. The aforementioned stratification was chosen to provide a
plausible representation of cases that can be encountered in medical practice. As we
quoted before (Chapter II, paragraph 2.2.3) from O'Keefe et al., "The issue is not the
number of cases, it is the coverage of the test cases" . 8 Given this axiom, the practical
problem of the number of clinicians involved, the care taken in the selection of the
cases and the number of cases used in other medical comparison and evaluation
studies, the number of cases used in this study is acceptable.s,9,1011,12,13
3.3 Comparison of the diagnoses
Another problem concerns the comparison of the diagnoses provided by the expert
system, the clinicians and the expert panel. In this study the comparison was
performed by the developers (not the panel of three external experts). In the ideal
situation it would have been desirable to have an independent institution perform the
comparison if it were possible to make that third party unaware about which
diagnoses were produced by a human and which by the system. Unfortunately, the
limited prose capabilities of our system (and, for that matter, almost any other system)
made it very implausible that such a third party could have been successfully blinded
for the source of the diagnoses. Given these problems, we share Shortliffe's opinion
that researchers should be able to evaluate their own system up to the laboratory
stage, more so, because it is common practice for researchers in other fields to perform
their own analyses on the data they gathered." Furthermore, this approach does not
preclude the possibility to have independent raters at a later stage in the field
evaluation.
4 POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE PROFICIENCY OF EVINCE
Compared to other medical expert systems the performance of Evince is remarkably
good, and it is tempting to ascribe this to the system. However, it is important to see
whether there are other factors that can explain the positive results. Prior to this
discussion we would like to stress that much of the following discussion is
speculative. Further experimentation will be necessary to test the suggested
hypotheses.
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4.1 Distinguishing between clinicians
As noted before, this is -to the best of our knowledge- the first study where an explicit
difference was made between expert clinicians and domain competent non-experts.
The reason for this differentiation is that the expert system is supposed to -at least-
approach the proficiency of human experts and surpass -at least- the average (domain
competent) non-expert in order to be beneficial to this group. Apart from the fact that
it is more realistic to compare the system's performance with both experts and the
average clinician, it provides a less demanding lower boundary of performance. This
means that Evince's proficiency can partly be explained by the fact that a difference
was made between experts and domain competent non-experts. Consequently, it is
likely that other medical expert systems will show a better performance if they were
reevaluated using this method.
4.2 The multidisciplinary versus the monodisciplinary approach
The multidisciplinary knowledge of Evince could be another reason for its proficiency
because Evince was compared with clinicians who diagnosed the patient cases
individually (except for the expert panel). The finding in Chapter VI that clinicians
from different disciplines focus on different etiologies, makes it plausible that the
interpretation of the patient data was discipline dependent. Consequently, it is very
well possible that the performance of the 85 clinicians would have been better if they
were given the chance to discuss the cases with colleagues from other disciplines.
However, this possibility also emphasizes one of the themes of this study, namely,
that the diagnosis of dementia requires a multidisciplinary approach. This is reflected
in the knowledge represented in Evince which is derived from international criteria
such as provided by the DSM-III-R, the NINCDS-ADRDA work group, the Hamilton
Depression Rating Scale, the Hachinski Ischaemic Index, etc. Unfortunately, such a
multidisciplinary approach is far from common practice because it is time consuming
and requires clinicians from several disciplines to be available for a joint conference. In
this respect the data about the performance of the clinicians provide a realistic picture
of daily practice. It is exactly at this point that Evince could provide the individual
clinician assistance: interpretation of data attained through additional examinations,
using knowledge from other relevant disciplines. We would like to stress that Evince
cannot aid, for example, a neurologist by conducting a complete psychiatric
examination, administering and judging a CT-scan, or by analyzing a blood sample.
Clinician will still be dependent on colleagues from other disciplines to conduct
certain examinations. However, Evince can help the clinician to interpret data
resulting from such examination requests. A field evaluation in which clinicians with
and without the aid of Evince are compared will have to be performed to test this
assumption. Additionally, it will be interesting to see how well a team of randomly
selected clinicians perform in comparison to an expert panel, when they are given the
chance to discuss patient cases.
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4.3 The diagnostic spectrum
The number of possible diagnoses, i.e., the diagnostic spectrum, is another potential
source of influence on the results. As the number of diagnoses that is available to
Evince is smaller than the number available to the average clinician who's knowledge
covers more than dementia, it is possible that this caused the large diversity among
the 85 clinicians and, consequently, a lower performance in comparison with Evince.
However, there are a few objections to make against this argument. Firstly, like the
expert panel, the clinicians were informed that the inquiry was about the present
status of dementia diagnostics. Furthermore, the patient case descriptions all provided
a paragraph about the patient's cognitive complaints. Thus, the clinicians were
appropriately primed to the problem domain. Secondly, if the diagnostic spectrum
was a problem, i.e., if diagnoses outside the domain were given, then it is likely that
this also would have occurred within the expert panel, which it did not. Thirdly, the
only problem with the diagnostic spectrum that did occur was within the limits of the
domain of dementia. For example, further analysis of the data by Verhey et al.`
showed that clinicians displayed less agreement about the diagnoses of patients with
low levels of deterioration (as measured by the Global Deterioration Scale score16),
than for patients with a high level of deterioration. However, clinicians are commonly
expected to be able to deal with these types of patients. If the clinicians would have
had problems eliminating diagnoses outside the problem domain, then the present
status of dementia diagnostics in daily practice would have been even more serious
than expected. The finding that the diagnostic spectrum of dementia itself is difficult
for the average clinician was conform our expectations, and exactly the reason why
Evince was developed.
4.4 Human errors
A much more obvious source of errors leading to a better performance of Evince are
typical human errors such as the incorrect use of criteria, neglecting criteria,
overlooking data, incorrect interpretation of data, applying an incorrect procedure in
analyzing the data, and anchoring (see also Chapter VII, paragraph 5). Which errors
are made most often and which have the largest impact cannot be determined on the
basis of our data as we were unable to record the diagnostic reasoning of the 85
clinicians. A completely different study would be required to cover that subject.
4.5 The sample of 85 clinicians
The problem with the sample of 85 clinicians is whether it is a true representation of
all clinicians involved in dementia diagnostics. There were at least three decisions
made by the clinicians that influenced the composition of the sample: 1) the clinician's
decision to take part in the consensus meeting, 2) the decision to take part in the first
inquiry, and 3) the decision to take part in the second inquiry. The clinicians could
have made the first decision because they either felt certain or uncertain about their
diagnostic knowledge concerning dementia, or simply because they acknowledged
that there is a need for more consensus about dementia diagnostics. It should be
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stressed that the meeting was not a course in dementia diagnostics, but a conference
where criteria, procedures and recent findings were debated, led by a panel of experts
from all over the country. This makes it plausible that the attending clinicians were
knowledgeable on the subject matter. In other words, if there was a sampling bias,
then it is likely that this bias resulted in a more favourable diagnostic performance.
However, it cannot be totally excluded that some attenders were not sufficiently
qualified given the fact that a few inquiry forms were returned with a notice from the
clinician that he did not feel competent enough to participate. As for the latter two
decisions, i.e., the decision to participate in the first and the second inquiry, we can
only gues what the reasons of the participants could have been, for example, to help
science, or to test their competence.
Unfortunately, the problem of selection bias cannot be ruled out in any experiment
that relies on the use of volunteers. This problem is bound to reoccur in field testing,
when institutions and individuals volunteer to cooperate in such an experiment. The
best solution would be to have an exhaustive sample, i.e., testing the entire
population. However, even if that were possible, this still leaves the question open
whether the results will be representative for clinical practice in other countries."
The second best solution is to compare known population characteristics (if available)
with the characteristics of the sample to test whether the sample can be considered to
be a good represention of the population.
4.6 The knowledge representation
The type of knowledge representation, i.e, rule based, could be considered another
possible reason for the good performance of Evince, meaning that rule based system
would provide a better representation of the medical knowledge in this domain.
However, this seems to us a poor argument for the explanation of the performance of
Evince. Stating that a rule based knowledge representation leads to a better
performance of this expert system is like stating that programming language X leads
to better programs than programming language Y. The decision to use a rule based
system was based on the assumption that this type of knowledge representation
would be easier to understand for the potential user, not because the knowledge
would be easier to represent. Furthermore, Acquaint is not a pure rule based expert
system shell, but a hybrid system.
More important than how knowledge is represented, is what is represented. If the
knowledge of the system is inadequate, then the performance of the system will be
inadequate, no matter how it was represented internally. This does not mean that
knowledge representation is not an important issue in expert system development. In
this domain the use of frames and rules were convenient, because part of the
documented knowledge, for example, the DSM-III-R, was available in a rule-like form,
while the frames provided a good tool for representing the diagnostic concepts.
Like programming languages, types of knowledge representation should be judged
on their adequacy to solve the problem. An adequate type of knowledge
representation can lead to a system with a good performance, but it is certainly not a
guarantee for succes.
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5 FIELD EVALUATION
Although Evince passed the formal laboratory tests with results well above average, a
field evaluation still has to be performed. Preparations for such a study were made,
but revealed several new problems left to be worked out. For example, one of the
problems to perform a field experiment is to find a suitable institution for the
experiments. Not every institution offers suitable opportunities for a field study, such
as sufficient and consistent availability of time and personnel, and complete (or
reasonably complete) patient records. Another problem encountered was that the
available patient records did not contain all the information required by Evince,
because the data were not gathered by the institution according to a standard
procedure. Furthermore, some of the data in the patient records were gathered using
clinical tests that were different from those used by Evince. This means that some of
the concepts had a different definition, making it difficult to decide whether the
results could be used by Evince. Temporal data were a problem for methodological
reasons. In some cases the available data were derived from examinations that were
performed at different moments and at different institutions, causing recent and
relative old data to be intertwined in the records. Although Evince can reason with
incomplete data, it limits the performance of the system, and devaluates its utility.
Evince was designed to use international criteria and procedures for dementia
diagnostics, to help the clinician to standardize the examination protocol and to use
the data derived using this protocol, not to interpret arbitrary data from any available
patient record.
The alternativo would be to perform a prospective study using our standard
examination procedure. However, such an experiment requires a large effort from the
cooperating institutions and is expensive, because diagnostic procedures customary in
the institution would have to be performed in parallel with the experimental approach
in order to avoid disruption of the daily routine in the institution. 18 This problem
illustrates the important dilemma between acceptability of costs and scientific
credibility as recently noted by Shortliffe.'" Still, we believe that a field experiment
should be performed because there are many parameters involved in the routine use
of an ES that are difficult to test in a laboratory, like user characteristics, geographical
differences, organizational routine, familiarity with information systems, etc.
However, despite these problems there were a few preliminary positive findings. As
was expected, there were hardly any problems in operating the system. It turned out
that the users became rapidly familiar with the available menus and function keys.
This ease of use was noted many times on other occasions when clinicians were
allowed to freely use the system. Even clinicians who were not familiar with
computers were able to operate the system after some brief instructions.
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6 INTEGRATION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS
One of the most important future issues to be solved is the integration of ESs with
other information systems.19 The most central part of these information systems is
undoubtedly the patient database. Integration of information systems would mean
that the same database can be used for different purposes. 2° Unfortunately, the
information in databases is still not standardized in such a way that it can be used by
different information systems. Different institution use different coding systems or
free text, administer different tests, use different checklists, and even have different
opinions about the concepts used . 5 This means that existing databases cannot be used
by, for example, an ES that was developed by another institution without modifying
the database's content. This incompatibility poses an important limitation to the
widespread use of ESs and also indicates that there are serious shortcomings in the
development of medical consensus and its subsequent use in daily practice.
The best solution to this problem is a rigorous standardization of the data used by
information systems, in particular the items stored in databases. If this can be
accomplished, then an ES (or any other information system) can be built without the
need to augment or reorganize existing information. Without standardized
information it will be unlikely that ESs will or even can be used on a large scale.
7 SELF LEARNING MEDICAL EXPERT SYSTEMS
One of the many important properties ESs Jack in comparison with humans, is the
ability to learn, i.e., machine learning. Although progress has been made in this
respect, the learning ability of computer systems is very limited. Z ' Apart from the
question whether it is possible to design a system that is capable of learning, there is
the question whether it is desirable. As mentioned before, one of the advantages of
ESs is their consistent use of diagnostic criteria, without respect to the location of their
use. However, a self learning system discovers relations and creates rules on the basis
of the cases presented and is allowed to use these rules after acceptance by the user(s).
Consequently, this leads to systems that differ from location to location, for example,
due to cultural and geographical differences between patient populations. This would
result in a situation resembling the present with geographic, inter-disciplinary and
even intra-disciplinary differences in the use of clinical concepts, diagnostic criteria
and procedures. To avoid such local dependency self learning ESs would have to be
provided with material, either in the form of raw data from specially developed
reference databases, or in the form of explicit rules from professional and/or scientific
forums. Given these problems, it seems more beneficial to have ESs that do not learn
by themselves, at least not when they are being used in daily practice. Another
consequence of a self learning, or locally educated system is that it will be difficult to
evaluate, because its knowledge changes continuously, i.e., the system becomes
unpredictable. It seems unlikely that clinicians will accept an ES that behaves
differently depending on which patients have been examined with the system.
However, a self learning mechanism can prove useful for the development of ESs
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and for research as a tool for automated discovery, much like experiments and
statistics are being used. 22
 For example, machine learning could be used to discover
relations between data, or to assess the importance of symptoms and signs. In this
respect, the use of artificial neural networks is very promising, although such systems
are truely black boxes because they cannot provide any explanation for the decisions
taken . '2425
8 THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF EVINCE AND EXPERT SYSTEMS IN GENERAL.
At present computerized equipment and computer software have penetrated health
care in almost every medical discipline and at many stages of patient care. Information
systems are replacing traditional paper patient records, other programs calculate drug
dosage or monitor vital functions of patients in intensive care. Undoubtedly the
computer will continue to pervade health care. In this respect ES technology is only
one of the latest examples of computer technology to enter health care and, similar to
the introduction of computerized billing applications during the 1960s, medical
personnel will increasingly rely on computerized decision aids. Although there are
still many technical and methodological difficulties in developing and evaluating
computerized decision aids (even in such seemingly simple applications as
computerized Admission-Discharge-Transfer or billing systems26) and although
there are important questions about the legai implications of computerized health
care, there are also important advantages 2728'9
For ESs in general, and Evince in specific, the main advantage lies in their ability to
integrate knowledge from several disciplines, their consistent approach to diagnostics,
and their ability to use all available data and recent diagnostic knowledge. In addition,
the use of an ES makes the diagnostic results more comparable between institutions,
even more than in the case where paper protocols are used, because not only the tests
and procedures are standardized, but also the interpretation of the resulting data. In
contrast, the average clinician's knowledge is not always up to date, sometimes shows
inconsistent reasoning, and does not always use the diagnostic criteria consistently
(c.f. Chimowitz et al.30 ). This is especially true for a problem domain where the
required knowledge comes from several disciplines while the individual clinician is
specialized in one discipline, as is usually the case in dementia diagnostics. 31 This
does not mean that clinicians can or even should be replaced by ESs. Apart from the
(important) question whether it is desirable to have a computer taking care of the
interaction with the patients, ESs lack too many properties and too much knowledge
to be able to replace the human clinician. Therefore, Evince could never replace the
clinician. Furthermore, Evince cannot perform the actual medical examinations, these
will still have to be administered by human clinicians. Unfortunately, this is also the
weak spot of Evince: if the clinician makes mistakes in the medical examination than it
is very likely that the resulting diagnoses will also be erroneous, i.e. 'garbage in,
garbage out'.
However, an ES like Evince can play an important additional role in medical diagnosis,
and apart from being an important aid in diagnostics, there are also other positive
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effects. For example, the use of Evince -or any ES, for that matter- can produce a
checklist effect, which helps the clinician not to forget essential topics of examination.
Also the carry-over effect can be benificial, asuming that errors of the ES do not pass
unnoticed. This means that the clinician starts learning how the ES performs the
diagnostics and adopts the criteria and approach of the system. A possible
consequence of this learning mechanism is that the clinician no longer needs the ES
after using it for a longer period, or, more dangerously, thinks he no longer needs the
ES. Another possible advantage of ESs (and more generally computerized decision
aids) is that it requires a clear definition of knowledge. As Van Bemmel noted, this
endeavor by itself might reduce the need for decision support methods 32
Next to these important advantages we would like to point out a possible danger of
uniform diagnostic protocols due to a widespread use of ESs. To some extent, the use
of alternative procedures can provide insight in other and new aspects of a disease.
Therefore, a uniform approach can be a serious limitation to the development of new
diagnostic procedures. However, care should be taken that this argument is not used
to justify a panacea of protocols, because the limitation of a uniform procedure can be
overcome by having an ES that uses different knowledge on the same domain, and by
the fact that clinical research institutions will still have to rely heavily on human
resources. This means that ESs can be compared with other standardized medical
technologies. The use of non standardized methods would then be restricted to
research institutions for experimentation.
When approximately 41 % to 45% of the patients who are examined for memory
complaints receive a wrong or partially wrong diagnosis (as reported by Hoffman33
and Verhey et al. 34), then this will result in inappropriate therapy or referral.
Consequently, the use of an ES could have an important impact in the improvement of
health care and a concomitant reduction of health care costs.
Next to the role ESs can play directly in health care, they can also have an important
indirect impact through their use in research, where there is a strong need for a
uniform means of measurement, for example, to select patients for a clinical trial. Up
till now, the procedure was to develop a standard selection procedure which was then
checked for inter- and intrarater reliability, because the interpretation of the data
gathered is subject to variation. With the use of ESs only the inter- and intrarater
variability due to differences in the actual examination will have to be checked. This
could result in an important reduction of the costs and an increased reliability of the
experimental results.
Given the previously mentioned carry-over effect, ESs can also play a role in
medical education, although they will have to be adapted to provide the student user
much more (educational) information than is usually the case in ESs developed for
routine medical practice. A major advantage of ESs as an educational tool is that the
expert knowledge is more explicitly available and that the student is able to
manipulate the data to see what the effect is on the diagnosis. However, as in routine
medical practice, the finesses of medical education will still require the aid of human
clinicians. Finally, the use of ESs in education could help to avoid that potential users
view such systems (and other information systems) as if they were Greek oracles and
help them to understand both the benefits and the risks of ESs, or Al products in
general'.
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9 CLOSING COMMENTARY
As Hellman17
 noted, "Probably the three major societal forces which will impact
which health professionals will be in demand in the year 2000 are the graying of
America, the economics of health care, and the over supply of MDs and their changing
role". Without doubt, this statement is applicable to the entire western civilization,
including the Netherlands. Hellman further notes, that this will create a demand for
professionals to take care of this increasing part of our population, i.e., the elderly, and
an increased demand on financial resources. Although the total cost of the health care
sector in the Netherlands has stabilized in recent years, there is a clear change of
policy to emphasize the "limits to growth" in health care. 38 This means that health
care will have to be made more efficient, for example by more accurate diagnoses to
reduce the occurrence of incorrect referrals and to increase the adequacy of therapies.
However, due to the limited financial resources, it is unlikely that this efficiency will
be realized by employing more (expensive) health care professionals, which means
that less people will have to take care of more patients. ES, and information
technology in general, will undoubtedly play an important role in the endeavor to
solve these problems in the (near) future.
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SUMMARY
This thesis describes the development of the neuropsychiatric expert system Evince
for the differential diagnosis of dementia, and the subsequent experiments in which
the expert system was compared with clinicians from several medical disciplines who
are involved in dementia diagnostics. An expert system is a computer program that is
equally proficient in solving problems, in a specific domain, as a human expert in the
same field.
Although many medical expert systems have been developed only a few have
been subjected to an extensive formal evaluation. Even less expert systems have been
developed for the psychiatric domain, and none for the neuropsychiatric field of
dementia diagnostics, because this domain is generally considered too difficult to
implement in an expert system, due to the use of descriptive criteria, and a multitude
of data with very different origins. Furthermore, many of the expert systems that were
developed were meant to be used on a mainframe, mini computer, or workstation,
which makes such systems less attractive for many small or medium large institution.
In this thesis it is shown that it is possible to develop an expert system for an IBM-
PC compatible desk-top microcomputer on the domain of the neuropsychiatric
dementia diagnostics, that produces a performance equal to a multidisciplinary team
of expert clinicians and better than the average clinician.
Chapter I gives a short introduction in the history of artificial intelligence and
expert system research. Furthermore, an introduction is given into the previous efforts
to develop expert system within the domain of psychiatry, and the lessons that can be
learned from those earlier attempts. Chapter II identifies the lack of thorough expert
system evaluations studies as one of the reasons why expert systems have been so
slow in penetrating daily practice. Additionally some of the most recent ideas about
expert system evaluation are discussed. An adapted three stage model from Wyatt
and Spiegelhalter' for expert system evaluation is proposed, and some of the pro-
blems and possibilities of this model are discussed. In chapter III the expert system
development tool Acquaint that was used for the development of Evince is reviewed.
Chapter IV continues with a description of the development method used, i.e., the
incremental top-down development of Evince. Furthermore, in this chapter the
sources of knowledge, the knowledge acquisition, and the architecture of Evince are
discussed. The following chapters contain a description of the experiments performed
to assess the performance of Evince.
Chapter V is a report about the first experiment in which Evince was tested in diag-
nosing 19 patients with varying stages of dementia and 10 patients showing other
disorders except dementia. Jt is shown that EVINCE-I and the human expert are in
perfect agreement on the diagnosis dementia and correlate highly on the diagnoses
dementia of the Alzheimer type and multiple infarct dementia. The results showed
that the approach followed for the development of Evince was successful. Therefore,
Wyatt J, Spiegelhalter D. Evaluating medical expert systems: what to test and how? Medical
Informatics. 1990, 15; 3: 205-217.
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Evince was developed further on the basis of these results. This revised and expanded
version of Evince was to be tested by comparing it with clinicians from several
disciplines from outside the institution where Evince was developed.
In order to gain more insight in the performance of the average clinicians involved
in dementia diagnostics, an experiment described in chapter VI was set up in which 90
clinicians from 6 disciplines diagnosed 10 case descriptions of patients, judged by a
multidisciplinary expert committee to suffer from dementia. Five cases were diag-
nosed before and 5 after a consensus meeting on the diagnosis of dementia. A
significant change in the level of agreement between the disciplines could not be
established. The analysis did show a significant difference between the disciplines in
the use of etiological diagnoses. The results indicated that, in order to avoid possible
bias caused by medical specialization, a multidisciplinary approach for this type of
patients is recommended.
Finally, in chapter VII an experiment is described in which Evince is compared
with 85 clinicians in diagnosing 10 patients suspected of suffering from dementia. A
multi-disciplinary expert committee provided a standard diagnosis as reference for
comparison. The results show that the syndrome and etiological diagnoses made by
Evince were in very close agreement with those of the expert committee and that the
diagnostic performance of Evince was better than that of the average clinician.
In the final chapter (VIII) a general discussion of the findings is presented, and the
limitations and possible implications of the use of Evince for dementia diagnostics in
practice are discussed. Furthermore some topics for future research are addressed.
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SAMENVATTING
In dit proefschrift wordt de ontwikkeling beschreven van een neuropsychiatrisch
expertsysteem (Evince) voor de differentiële diagnostiek van dementie, en de
experimenten waarin het expertsysteem werd vergeleken met clinici uit verschillende
medische disciplines die betrokken zijn bij dementiediagnostiek. Een expertsysteem is
een computerprogramma dat, bij het oplossen van problemen in bepaald domein,
prestaties levert die vergelijkbaar zijn met die van een menselijke expert op dat terrein.
Hoewel in de loop der jaren veel medische expertsystemen zijn ontwikkeld, werden
slechts enkele daarvan onderworpen aan een grondige formele evaluatie. Nog minder
expertsystemen werden ontwikkeld voor de psychiatrie en geen op het gebied van de
neuropsychiatrische dementiediagnostiek, omdat dit terrein te gecompliceerd geacht
werd voor implementatie in een computer programma, onder andere door het gebruik
van descriptieve criteria en de grote verscheidenheid van de vereiste gegevens. Verder
waren veel van de ontwikkelde expertsystemen bedoeld voor gebruik op zogenaamde
'mainframes', mini-computers of werkstations, waardoor het gebruik van dergelijke
programma's minder interessant is voor kleine(re) instellingen.
In dit proefschrift wordt aangetoond dat het mogelijk is een expertsysteem voor een
IBM-compatibele microcomputer te ontwikkelen op het gebied van de neuropsychia-
trische dementiediagnostiek, dat resultaten levert die vergelijkbaar zijn met die van
een multidisciplinair team van experts, en beter dan de prestaties van de gemiddelde
clinicus.
In hoofdstuk I wordt een korte introductie gegeven in de geschiedenis van het
wetenschappelijk onderzoek van kunstmatige intelligentie en expertsystemen. Verder
krijgt de lezer een kort overzicht van eerdere pogingen om expertsystemen op het
gebied van de neuropsychiatrie te ontwikkelen en de lessen die daaruit geleerd
kunnen worden.
In Hoofdstuk II wordt ingegaan op het gebrek aan grondige expertsysteemevaluaties
en wijst het gebrek aan dergelijke evaluaties aan als één van de oorzaken waarom
expertsystemen zo langzaam in de dagelijkse praktijk doordringen. Bovendien wor-
den enkele van de meest recente vooraanstaande ideeën over expertsysteemevaluatie
besproken. Er wordt een aangepast model van Wyatt en Spiegelhalter" met drie stadia
geïntroduceerd, waarna de mogelijkheden en problemen van dat model worden be-
sproken.
Hoofdstuk III beschrijft het expertsysteem-ontwikkelingsgereedschap Acquaint dat
gebruikt is voor het bouwen van Evince. Hoofdstuk IV gaat verder met een beschrij-
ving van de gebruikte ontwikkelingsmethode, i.e. de incrementele en van het alge-
mene in de bijzonderheden afdalende methode. Bovendien worden in dit hoofdstuk
de kennisacquisitie, de kennisbronnen en de architectuur van Evince besproken. De
daaropvolgende hoofdstukken bevatten een beschrijving van de experimenten die
werden uitgevoerd om de prestatie van Evince vast te stellen.
• Wyatt J, Spiegelhalter D. Evaluating medical expert systems: what to test and how? Medical
Informatics. 1990, 15; 3: 205-217.
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Hoofdstuk V bevat de rapportage over het eerste experiment waarin Evince vergele-
ken werd met een menselijke expert in het diagnostiseren van 19 patiënten in verschil-
lende dementiestadia en 10 patiënten met andere stoornissen, maar geen dementie.
Aangetoond wordt dat Evince en de menselijke expert volledige overeenstemming
vertonen over de diagnose dementie en een hoge mate van overeenkomst over de
diagnose dementie van het type Alzheimer en multiple infarct dementie. Deze resul-
taten laten zien dat de gevolgde ontwikkelingsmethode succesvol was. Op basis van
deze resultaten werd Evince verder ontwikkeld.
Deze aangepaste en uitgebreide versie van Evince werd getoetst in een vergelijking
met clinici uit verschillende disciplines die afkomstig waren van buiten het instituut
waar Evince werd ontwikkeld. Om meer inzicht te krijgen in de prestaties van de
gemiddelde clinicus die te maken heeft met dementiediagnostiek, werd een experi-
ment opgezet dat beschreven wordt in hoofdstuk VI, waarin 90 clinici uit 6 disciplines
ieder 10 patiënten diagnostiseerden aan de hand van een casusbeschrijving. Vijf van
de casusbeschrijvingen werden vóór en vijf na een consensusbijeenkomst over
dementiediagnostiek beoordeeld. Op basis van de beschikbare gegevens kon geen
belangrijke verandering in het niveau van overeenstemming tussen de disciplines
worden vastgesteld als gevolg van de consensusbijeenkomst. De analyses lieten echter
wel een significant verschil zien tussen de disciplines in het gebruik van etiologische
diagnosen. De resultaten gaven aan dat een multidisciplinaire aanpak bij dementie-
diagnostiek is aan te bevelen, om te voorkomen dat de uiteindelijke diagnose gekleurd
wordt door een medische specialisatie.
Tenslotte wordt in hoofdstuk VII een experiment beschreven waarin Evince vergele-
ken wordt met 85 clinici in het diagnostiseren van 10 patiënten waarvan vermoed
werd dat ze leden aan een vorm van dementie. De diagnosen van een multidiscipli-
nair forum bestaande uit drie experts op het gebied van dementiediagnostiek fun-
geerden als referentie voor de vergelijking. De resultaten van die vergelijking lieten
zien dat de syndroom en etiologische diagnosen van Evince nauw overeen kwamen
met die van het forum en beter waren dan die van de gemiddelde clinicus.
Het laatste hoofdstuk (VIII) bevat een algemene discussie over de resultaten, beper-
kingen van Evince en de mogelijke implicaties van het gebruik van Evince bij
dementiediagnostiek, en enkele onderwerpen voor toekomstig onderzoek.
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subsidie van het ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, onderzoek
verricht naar de ontwikkeling en evaluatie van een neuropsychiatrisch expertsysteem,
waarvan dit proefschrift de weerslag is. In de toekomst zal hij zich verder bezig
houden met expertsystemen, artificiële neurale netwerken en de integratie van die
twee.
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Appendix I
Hardware and software requirements.
Version 3.25 of Acquaint requires a IBM compatible PC microcomputer with a
minimum of 520 Kbytes of RAM (620 Kbytes of RAM is recommended) and a hard-
disk drive. Although Evince can be used on a microcomputer with the Intel 8088 or
8086 microprocessor, a 80286 is recommended.
Evince can be used with a monochrome or a color monitor.
The complete Evince program package consists of:
EVINCE.EXE 225.920 Kbyte: the shell program
EVINCE.TXT 9.724 Kbyte: the text source for the shell
MANAGER.RB 21.397 Kbyte: the over head rulebase
MANAGER.RBE 3.567 Kbyte: the text source
DATABASE.RB 73.553 Kbyte: the database rulebase
DATABASE.RBE 29.098 Kbyte: the text source
CONSULT.RB 92.893 Kbyte: the batch/interactive consult rulebase
CONSULT.RBE 26.830 Kbyte: the text source
REPORT.RB 33.334 Kbyte: the report rulebase
REPORT.RBE 8.636 Kbyte: the text source
CONFIG.LOG 68 KByte: for configuration storage.
Total: 524.988 KByte

